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FREEDOM ®F EXPRESSION: IS IT ALL JUST TALK?
A . Wayne MacKay*
Halifax
In this article Professor MacKay argues that effective interpretation of section
2 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms requires the weighing of real world
impacts beyond the traditional liberal parameter ofjudicial decisions . The usual
judicial unwillingness to acknowledge "freedoms", as opposed to "rights",
limits governmental legal action while not recognizing political and economic
barriers to freedom of expression. The trend toward limiting protected expression both at the dejinitional stage and through section 1 reasonable limits reflects
this cautious approach.
The article examines who the early beneficiaries offreedom of expression
have been : those affected by criminal sanctions and those who can afford litigation . The latter group consists largely of business pursuing commercial free
speech and the corporate-controlled media pursuing `freedom of the Press" .
Focusing on freedom of the press, the author asks the "crucial question"
whose interests are being served? The tacit acceptance of liberalism is implicit
in the usual notion of a free press . This fails to consider that the press is not
neutral and mostfrequently favours business elites whose interests are already
well-served by the political process without the protections of the Charter. The
balancing of various interests by the courts is closely examined in sections
covering media access to the courts and possible conflict between freedom of
the press and other legal rights.
In conclusion, MacKay calls for a shift away from the role offreedom of
expression as an instrument in the democratic process, toward its. use, to promote primarily community self-actualization, entailing judicial willingness to
stop relying on liberal theory and focus on actual life impacts on disparate,
and often marginalized, groups in society.
Dans cet article le professeur MacKay soutient que, pour être valable, l'interprétation de l'article 2 de la Charte des droits et libertés doit prendre en
considération les conséquences de la vie pratique qui vont au delà des paramètres traditionnels libéraux des décisions judiciaires . Le manque d'enthousiasme habituel des tribunaux à reconnaître les "libertés", par opposition aux
"droits", limite la liberté d'action en justice du gouvernement sans pour cela
reconnaître les entraves politiques et économiques mises à la liberté d'expression. La tendance qui existe de limiter l'expression protégée à la fois au stade
de la définition et par les limites raisonnables de l'article 1 reflète la prudence
de cette approche.
*A . Wayne MacKay, Professor at Dalhousie Law School, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia .
I would like to acknowledge the valuable research assistance of Pamela Rubin, a
1989 graduate of Dalhousie Law School, and to thank Professor Robin Elliot for reading
the manuscript and making helpful suggestions .
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V autteur se demande ensuite quels ont été les premiers bénéficiaries de la
liberté d'expression: ceux qui courent les risques de poursuites criminelles et
ceux qui peuvent se permettre d'aller en justice . Dans ce dernier groupe, il
s'agit en grande partie de commerces qui réclament la liberté d'expression
pour leur commerce et de médias dirigés par des grandes compagnies, qui
réclament la "liberté de la presse" .
MacKay s'intéresse alors plus particulièrement à la liberté de la presse et
pose la question capitale : quels intérêts cette liberté sert-elle? L'acceptation
tacite du libéralisme est implicite dans l'idée qu'on sefait habituellement de la
presse libre . Cette attitude ne tient pas compte du fait que la presse n'est pas
neutre mais qu'elle favorise le plus souvent les dirigeants du monde des affaires dont les intérêts sont déjà bien servis par les institutions politiques sans
avoir recours à la Charte . On trouvera un examen détaillé de la considération
par les tribunaux des divers intérêts dans les parties qui traitent de l'accès des
médias à la justice et du confit qui peut exister entre la liberté de la presse et
les autres droits .
MacKay affirme en conclusion qu'il est temps de changer le rôle de la
liberté d'expression pour enfaire non plus un instrument de la démocratie mais
un instrument destiné à encourager avant tout le développement de la commut
nauté dans le sens où elle veut s'exprimer, ce qui implique, pour les tribunaux,
la volonté non plus de s'appuyer sur la théorie libérale mais de considérer
avant tout l'influence de la vie réelle sur les divers groupes, souvent en marge,
qui forment la société.

I. The Nature and Purposes of Section 2(b) of the Charter
A . The Basic Rationales
Freedom of expression was not invented by the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms' but it has acquired new dimensions as a consequence of
its entrenchment . Similarly freedom of the press is being raised with
new vigour in Canadian courts . Whose interests are being promoted in
the advancement of both these freedoms? This article will attempt to
address this question at this early stage in Charter development.
As with most sections of the Charter, the claims are arising in two
major settings. Section 2(b) claims are being raised by accused persons
in both criminal trials and young offender proceedings . The costs of
such challenges are often borne by legal aid defence counsel . The second
area of claims is challenges raised by the corporate media who can afford
to pursue such matters in expensive litigation . There have been few
claims by Canadians in other contexts to section 2(b) and some of those
are advanced by organized lobby groups . So far the Charter has not
been used by poor people who speak out against administrators of welfare or by poverty legal aid clinics, which have suffered funding cuts for

1
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supporting parties opposed to the government . z The early trend is that
freedom of expression has not been a major weapon for the poor except
when they are facing a criminal sanction . 3 How the courts deal with the
cases will determine if this trend will continue .
The need for a purposive analysis of Charter guarantees has been
well established by the Supreme Court of Canada. I shall not repeat here
the oft quoted passages from Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker,4
Hunter v. Southam Inc. s and R. v. Rig M Drug Mart . b Instead, I shall
attempt to follow them by briefly putting section 2(b) in its historical,
linguistic and philosophical contexts .
Historically, freedom of speech and the press in Canada had acquired
quasi-constitutional status even prior to the Charter. )Freedom of speech
was regarded as a vital part of the proper operation of Parliamentary
institutions in a democratic society. To that extent freedom of speech
and the press are implicit in the phrase "a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom", found in the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 . Many of the pre-Charter cases arose as judicial responses
to repressive provincial regimes in Alberta and Quebec .
The focus of judicial review prior to the Charter was the division of
powers . Any issue related to civil liberties was restricted to a narrow
analysis of the federal or provincial competence over the subject matter.
The Alberta Press References exemplifies this approach with respect to
freedom of expression and the press . The case concerned a bill introduced by the Alberta Legislature to compel newspapers to disclose their
sources of news information and to print government statements correct2 In Nova Scotia, Social Services Minister Edmund Morris retaliated against a
sharply worded newspaper critique of him and his department by a single parent mother
on welfare, Ms . Thompson, by dismissing her as an N.D .P
. ghost writer. He then went
on to reveal personal information from her welfare files as a way of attacking her credibility . Ms . Thompson had the last say in the matter, however, as she launched a private
prosecution against Mr. Morris, alleging breach of the Freedom of Information Act,
S .N.S . 1977, c . 10 . Mr. Morris was found guilty and fined $100 .00 . This same Minister
of Social Services was instrumental in cutting funding to Dalhousie Legal Aid, a poverty
clinic, because it was a breeding ground for N.D .P
. supporters . S o far none of this has
produced a section 2(b) challenge because of the time and cost of pursuing such a claim .
3 I have not done a proper survey of the section 2(b) cases, and thus cannot make
this observation with statistical authority. However, it does seem to be borne out by the
cases that I have located .
4 [1984] 1 S .C .R. 357, (1984), 9 D .L .R . (4th) 161 .
5 [1984] 2 S .C .R . 145, (1984), 11 D .L .R . (4th) 641 .
6 (1985] 1 S .C .R . 295, (1985), 18 D .L .R . (4th) 321 .
7 Ibid ., at pp . 344 (S .C .R .), 359-360 (D .L .R .) . This three part purposive approach
to section 2(b) was followed in Re Cromer and B .C . Teachers' Federation (1986), 29
D .L .R . (4th) 641, 24 C .R .R . 271 (B .C .C .A .) .
8 Reference re Alberta Statutes, (1938] S .C .R . 100, [193812 D .L.R . 81 .
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ing previous articles . In striking down the bill, Duff C .J .C . concluded
that the province had no jurisdiction over the free working of the political institutions of the State. Thus, even prior to the Charter, political
expression, being a freedom vital to all of Canada, could not be eliminated by provincial legislation .
One significant departure from the division of powers approach was
seen in the judgments of Rand and Abbott JJ. in Saumur v. City of
Quebcg and later in Switzman v. Elbling and Attorney General of Quebec. Io
Both judgments accepted the approach taken in the Alberta Press Reference, but went on to establish an "implied bill of rights" guaranteeing
freedom of expression and the press in Canada, based on the fact that
the Constitution Act, 1867 referred to "a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom" . This theory did not gain much
attention outside these two decisions and was later rejected totally by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Attorney General of Canada and Dupond
v. City of Montreal . 11
The Alberta Press Reference, Saumur and Switzman all demonstrate that the courts in Canada recognized the importance of freedom of
the press despite the lack of any express constitutional guarantee. If one
is seeking to define the scope of such a freedom, however, the cases are
of little use. All three dealt with political speech only and left unaddressed
any questions concerning the extension of protection outside that realm .
It would be a mistake to view these cases as indicative of the courts'
desire to create a broader idea of freedom of the press in Canada ; in
fact, later cases like Cherneshe_y v. Armadale Publishers Ltd. 12 indicate
an unwillingness to promote a broad role for freedom of the press in
Canada . Protection of the inviolability and privacy of the individual and
personal reputation often won the day over freedom of the press .
Linguistically, section 2(b) of the Charter is a broad statement of
freedom of expression :
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms :
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of
the press and other media of communication.

This guarantee is quite detailed compared to the simple reference to
freedom of speech in the First Amendment to the American Constitution. It is also significant that the term press has also been extended to
include more modern forms of communication, such as the electronic
media. The term expression is semantically broader than speech and
9 1195312 S .C .R . 299, 1195314 D.L .R . 641 .
1° [1957] S .C .R . 285, (1957), 7 D.L .R . (2d) 337. Beetz J. appears to revive the
implied Bill of Rights in O.P.S .E .U. v. Attorney General of Ontario, [1987] 2 S .C .R . 2,
at p. 57 .
11 [197812 S.C .R . 770, (1978), 84 D.L .R . (3d) 420.
12 119791 1 S.C .R . 1067, (1978), 90 D.L .R . (3d) 321 .
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should extend to cover symbolic speech and other non-verbal forms of
expression . Since the state only limits "thought, belief and opinion" in
subtle ways and without known effect, expression will be the major
source of Charter challenges other than freedom of the press .
The guarantees of freedom of expression in section 2(b) are not
internally limited in the same way as the equivalent guarantees in the
European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights . 13 As can be seen from the relevant provisions from these two documents, the Canadian guarantee bears more resemblance to these documents than the American First Amendment, with
the exception of the internal modification, which is relevant to the proper
judicial approach to section 2(b)-discussed in the next section of this
article.
European Convention on Human Rights

1 . Everyone has the right to freedom of expression . This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall
not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or
cinema enterprises .
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests
of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of
the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

19 . (1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference .
(2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression ; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art,
or through any other media of his choice .
(3) The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities . It may therefore be subject to
certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and
are necessary;
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others ;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre publique),
or of public health or morals .

is The European Convention on Human Rights (Appendix 4), p. 557 and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Appendix 3), p. 543, in W Tamopolsky
and G. Beaudoin (eds .), The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms : Commentary
(1982) .
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Philosophically the approach to questions of freedom of expression
has not varied significantly from one western democracy to another. The
United States has been the main point of reference for Canadian judges
in respect to free speech theory, aided and abetted by the early academic
writers in the field ." In simple terms the American theorists offer two
major rationales for freedom of speech . One is the instrumental or political process rationale; the other is the individual self-actualization rationale . Both of these rationales are distinctly liberal in their origins and
emphasize the role of the individual in society and the predominant value
of liberty. Both of the foregoing values have been central in the interpretation of the American Bill of Rights . Whether they will be as central to
Charter interpretation in Canada remains to be seen.
The instrumental or political process rationale regards the guarantee
of freedom of expression as a means to other values rather than an end
in itself . There are two strands to this instrumental rationale as devel
oped in the United States . One sees freedom of speech as a means to
truth by the creation of a free "marketplace of ideas" in which competing ideas can vie for supremacy on the basis of rational logic . This
strand has been much criticized even by liberal academics such as Laurence Tribe : Is
This "marketplace of ideas" argument for freedom of speech may at times serve
liberty well, but it relies too dangerously on metaphor for a theory that purports to
be more hard-headed than literary. How do we know that the analogy of the market
is an apt one? Especially when the wealthy have more access to the most potent
media of communication than the poor, how sure can we be that "free trade in
ideas" is likely to generate truth? And what of falsity : is not the right to differ
about what is "the truth" subtly endangered by a theory that perceives communication as no more than a system of transactions for vanquishing what is false? What,
finally, of speech as an expression of self? As a cry of impulse no less than as a
dispassionate contribution to intellectual dialogue?

Tribe goes on in his text to describe the second branch of instrumental role for freedom of expression-the political process branch : 16

Closely related to the "marketplace of ideas" theory but even narrower in its
reach and more preclusive in its implications has been the view that free speech is
protected by the first amendment as essential to intelligent self-government in a
democratic system . As expounded by Alexander Meiklejohn, its most widely cited
proponent, this theory would limit the special guarantees of the first amendment to
public discussion of issues of civil importance ; in exchange for offering supposedly
"asbolute" protection to a political category of discourse, the theory would relegate to only minimal due process protection everything outside that category.

is C . Beckton, in Tarnopolsky and Beaudoin, ibid ., p. 75, and C. Beckton, Freedom of Expression in Canada-How Free?, in Can. Instit . for Admin. of Justice, The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Initial Experiences, Emerging Issues and
Future Challenges (1984), pp . 152-155, are examples of examining the Canadian situation in terms of American models of free speech,
15
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2nd . ed ., 1988), p. 786.
16
Ibid .
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This is the rationale that fits most comfortably with the emphasis
on the maintenance of parliamentary institutions in the pre-Charter Canadian cases discussed previously. However, Tribe is also critical of this
rationale for being under-inclusive and not doing justice to the majestic
sweep of the American First Amendment: t7

Yet when the theory has been thus expanded, it tells us disappointingly little .
Indeed, in none of its forms does it tell us a great deal, since it takes for granted
the virtues of the self-governance to which it argues that free speech is so necessary.
More generally, it must be said that Meiklejohn's conception of the first amendment, and Holmes', were both far too focused on intellect and rationality to accommodate the emotive role of free expression-its place in the evolution, definition,
and proclamation of individual and group identity.

Tribe is most attracted to the individual self-actualization rationale
for free speech because it regards the First Amendment as a value in
itself and not simply a means to other values : 18

To speak of "purposes" of the first amendment's protections of speech, press,
assembly, petition, and (by implication) association, is to risk begging the central
question posed by the Constitution's most majestic guarantee: is the freedom of
speech to be regarded only as a means to some further end-like successful selfgovernment, or social stability, or (somewhat less instrumentally) the discovery
and dissemination of truth-or is freedom of speech in part also an end in itself,
an expression of the sort of society we wish to become and the sort of persons we
wish to be? No adequate conception of so basic an element of our fundamental
law, it will be argued here, can be developed in purely instrumental or "purposive" terms .

What if anything should Canadian courts do with these various rationales evolved in the United States? As a first preliminary matter, account
should be taken of the significant political and social differences between
the two countries and how this has been reflected in their historical
approaches to freedom of expression and the press . As a second preliminary matter, the linguistic differences between the respective guarantees
of freedom of expression should be considered, and in particular the
European roots of the Canadian provision-section 2(b) of the Charter.
®n a more substantive basis the American rationales should only be
used to the extent that they are useful for advancing the purposes and
values of the Canadian document . The emphasis of the Supreme Court
of Canada on a purposive approach to the Charter might be a sign that it
will embrace an instrumental rationale. The Charter will be seen as a
means to achieve other values . However, many of the early Charter
cases have also stressed the dignity and the worth of the individual and
this could push the court towards a rationale of individual self-actualization . t9
" Ibid., p. 787.
is Ibid., p. 785.
19 R . v. Oakes, [19861 1 S.C .R . 103, at pp . 119-120, (l986), 50 C.R . (3d) 1, at
p. 15 :
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Most likely the Supreme Court of Canada and lower courts will
pick and choose between various theories depending upon the facts and
context of a particular case. While Beckton in her writings calls upon
the courts to develop a consistent theory of freedom of expression ,2o 1
see no problem with embracing various theories to be applied as the
justice of a particular situation demands.' It is important that Canadian
judges not be limited to American theories of free speech, or indeed to
those of other liberal western democracies . The extent to which freedom
of expression can be interpreted to change rather than affirm the existing
society may depend upon the range of theories the courts are willing to
embrace . Pluralism seems to be the ultimate conclusion of Tribe as the
desirable path for American courts :"
Any adequate conception of freedom of speech must instead draw upon several
strands of theory in order to protect a rich variety of expressional modes .

Freedom of the press as a protection of the rights of the Canadian
people illustrates the limitations of liberal theory in analyzing freedom
of expression . In a country where there is high corporate concentration
in all aspects of the media, giving rights to the media is more likely to
advance the interests of the corporate elite than those of the average
Canadian citizen. Professor Harry Glasbeek puts the issue clearly : 23
There is a (not very deeply) hidden agenda which causes the angst about
concentration of ownership. There are two items on this agenda . The first is endemic
to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms . As it is based on the idealized notion that
each individual is a sovereign, autonomous will, juridically equal to all other such
individuals, it does not allow for the fact that the granting of rights to all regardless of class or history might lead to distortions, or better, augmented distortions in
power.

To ignore the starting positions of people in discussing their rights
and freedoms is to ignore the real world impact of Charter decisions .

Although protected expressly in s . l I(d) of the Charter, the presumption of innocence is referable and integral to the general protection of life, liberty and security
of the person contained in s. 7 of the Charter (see Re B.C . Motor Vehicle Act,
119851 2 S .C .R . 486, per Lamer J .) . The presumption of innocence protects the
fundamental liberty and human dignity of any and every person accused by the
State of criminal conduct. An individual charged with a criminal offence faces
grave social and personal consequences, including potential loss of physical liberty,
subjection to social stigma and ostracism from community, as well as other social,
psychological and economic harm . In light of the gravity of these consequences,
the presumption of innocence is crucial.
`° Supra, footnote 14 .
-1 C. Boyle and S . Noonan, Prostitution and Pornography : Beyond Formal Equality, in C. Boyle, W MacKay, E. McBride and J. Yogis (eds .), Charterwatch: Reflections
on Equality (1986), p. 225 .
za Op . cit., footnote
15, p . 789.
`3 H. Glasbeek, Comment: Entrenchment of Freedom of Speech for the Press-Fettering
of Freedom of Speech of the People, in P Anisman and A. Linden (eds .), The Media,
The Courts and The Charter (1986), p. 111 .
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Ignoring the power and biases of the media is an equally shaky basis for
developing a meaningful doctrine of freedom of the press in Canada.
However, analyses such as those put forward by Glasbeek are too easily
dismissed as paranoid and Marxist in their orientation. The real objection is that they are to the left of the narrow liberal spectrum and therefore not worthy of consideration by our courts . Whatever the ideological
orientation of the writer, the crucial question is whether his or her views
reflect a reality that should be taken into account in interpreting freedom
of expression.
Failure to consider views about freedom of expression outside the
normal liberal spectrum, would in itself be a denial of freedom of expression in the real sense. Feminist perspectives on the issue of pornography
and freedom of expression is another illustration of the value of considering a variety of perspectives-including those which fall outside the
liberal mainstream . Values associated with the equality of women, by
adopting a feminist analysis, would be given greater weight in the balance of constitutional values than individualistic rights to freedom of
expression . 24 Whether this result would be achieved by excluding obscene
expression from the ambit of section 2(b) or tipping the balance of the
section 1 scales in favour of reasonable limits is not clear. Feminist
analysis would certainly focus attention on the impact of certain modes
of expression on the lives of women . On this latter point, some courts
have shown some sympathy with the feminist perspective . 25
What judges will do with freedom of expression under the Charter
will in most cases be limited by the parameters of liberalism. 26 Indeed,
the "free and democratic society" which has emerged as the major touch
stone in Charter interpretation is primarily a liberal construct . Whether
this is good or bad depends on one's views on liberalism, and whether it .
can accommodate real change in favour of the disadvantaged in society.
Freedom of expression is a classic liberal value and would be foremost in the minds of scholars such as Robert Samek who dismissed the

24
K. Lahey, The Charter and Pornography : Toward A Restricted Theory of Constitutionally Protected Expression, in J. weiler and R. Elliot (eds .), Litigating the Values
of a Nation : The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1986) . Not all feminists
agree on this controversial issue. Some regard section 2(b) of the Charter and feminist
visions of reality as quite compatible . T. McCormack, Two (b) or Not Two (b): Feminism and Freedom of Expression, in J. Lennox (ed.), Se Connaître: Politics and Culture
in Canada (1984), p. 64 .
2s R . v. Red Hot
Video (1985), 45 C.R . (3d) 36 (B .C .C .A .) . Also see S. Noonan,
Pornography : Preferring the Feminist Approach of the British Columbia Court of Appeal
to that of the Fraser Committee (1985), 45 C.R . (3d) 61 .
26 W
MacKay, Judging and Equality: For Whom Does the Charter Toll?, in Boyle
et al ., op . cit., footnote 21, pp . 62-87.
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Charter as a middle class document that would have little real impact on
the lives of average Canadians . Z' While such a prediction may prove
true, it is not inevitable . Freedom of expression, like all the Charter
rights, can be put to various uses, depending upon the values of the
judges interpreting it . Freedom of expression can be used to change
society as well as buttress the status quo, but the early cases do not
indicate a trend towards a radical transformation of society. The first
Supreme Court of Canada decision on freedom of expression set a cautious tone.
The vital nature of freedom of expression in a liberal society was
emphasized by McIntyre J . in Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd. 28 Referring to the works of John Milton
and John Stuart Mill, MacIntyre J . described freedom of expression as a
vital aspect of western democracies and thereby gave support to the
political process rationale for this freedom. 29
Freedom of expression is not, however, a creature of the Charter. It is one of the
fundamental concepts that has formed the basis for the historical development of
the political, social and educational institutions of western society. Representative
democracy, as we know it today, which is in great part the product of free expression and discussion of varying ideas . depends upon its maintenance and protection .

As a variation on this political process rationale McIntyre J. also
adopted the search for truth analysis alluded to earlier, and in particular
referred to the American concept of a market place of ideas as expounded
in Abrams v. United States . 3° In particular he cited the following passage with approval :"
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical . If
you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with
all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all oppo
sition . . . But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out.

Indicating that freedom of expression has roots as a constitutional
value in Canada even prior to the Charter, he cited a number of preCharter cases to the effect that freedom of speech is a pre-condition to

`'7 R.A . Samek, Untrenching Fundamental Rights (1982), 27 McGill L.J . 755.

zs [1986] 2 S.C .R . 577, (1986), 33 D.L .R . (4th) 174.
29
Ibid ., at pp . 583 (S .C .R .), 183 (D .L .R .) .
30 250 U.S .
616 (1919) .
31
Supra, footnote 28, at pp . 584 (S .C .R .), 184 (D .L .R .), quoting Abrams v. United
States, supra, footnote 30, at p. 630.
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the proper operation of parliamentary institutions in Canada .32 Finally he
cited Professor Hogg to the following effect: 33

Canadian judges have always placed a high value on freedom of expression as an
element of parliamentary democracy and have sought to protect it with the limited
tools that were at their disposal before the adoption of the Charter of Rights .

The first Supreme Court of Canada case on freedom of expression
indicates a cautious but not niggardly approach to section 2(b) of the
Charter. While not drawing a clear line between speech and conduct, the
court is willing to exclude things from the ambit of section 2(b) . Furthermore, the social and economic costs of giving effect to freedom of
expression will weigh heavily on the state's side of the balance in the
reasonable limits analysis . There were no real surprises in Dolphin Delivery
with respect to freedom of expression . Courts will engage in a purposive
analysis of freedom of expression, but the purposes likely to be adopted
are reflective of the liberal values of both the judges and the larger
Canadian society.
Although his later conclusions on state action in Dolphin Delivery
make all of McIntyre J.'s comments obiter on the issue of freedom of
expression, he appeared to adopt the instrumental approach to freedom
of expression rather than accept that expression is an end in itself. To
put the matter another way, the Supreme Court appears to adopt the
political process rationale rather than the one based on individual selfactualization. However, there is no express reference to the latter rationale and the court has embraced it in its recent judgment in Ford v.
Quebec (Attornery-General)," ruling on whether Bill 10135 violates freedom of expression by restricting the language used for expression . The
court fused a broad version of the instrumental approach with selfactualization rationales : 36
. . . the guarantee of freedom of expression in s. 2(b) . . . cannot be confined to
political expression important as that form of expression is . . . [it] is only one
form of the great range of expression that is deserving of constitutional protection
because it serves individual and societal values in a free and democratic society.

The court also described freedom of expression as meaning more
than the content of the expression it its narrowest sense, because of the

3z . Reference re Alberta Statutes, supra, footnote 8, Boucher v. R ., [1951] S .C .R .
265, [195112 D.L .R . 369; Switzman v. Elbling andAttorney-General of Quebec, supra,
footnote 10 . McIntyre J. in Dolphin Delivery, supra, footnote 28, at pp . 584-586 (S .C .R .),
184-185 (D .L .R .) quotes extensively from the judgments of Duff C.J .C . and Rand J. in
the foregoing cases.
33
P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (2nd ed ., 1985), p. 713, cited in
Dolphin Delivery, supra, footnote 28, at pp. 586 (S .C .R .), 185 (D .L .R .) .
34
[198812 S.C .R . 712, (1988), 54 D.L .R . (4th) 577.
3s
Charter of the French Language, R.S .Q . 1977, c . C-11 .
36
Ford v. Quebec (Attorney-General), supra, footnote 34, at pp . 764 (S .C .R .),
616 (D .L .R .) .
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freedom of thought, belief and opinion in section 2 . Language is regarded
as "so intimately related to the form and content of expression that there
cannot be true freedom of expression . . . if one is prohibited from using
the language of one's choice" . 37 Language is recognized not only as a
medium for an idea in the marketplace of ideas, but rather as something
which affects the very meaning and content of expression which is an
end in itself.
While mentioning individual and societal values, the judgment stopped
short of explicitly recognizing group rights to self-actualizing expression . Implicit acceptance, however, might be inferred from this judg
ment by the very fact that language of choice is at issue which implies a
community of speakers and listeners .
From the cases so far it appears that the courts will engage in a
purposive analysis of freedom of expression, but the purposes likely to
be adopted are reflective of the liberal values of both the judges and the
larger Canadian society.
B . Distinctions Between Freedoms and Rights
What significance, if any, is there in the designation of section 2
guarantees as freedoms rather than rights? In terms of what is expected
from governments there are some possible significant differences . In
respect to a freedom, the government is viewed as the enemy and the
role of the courts is to prevent the government from regulating what has
been identified as a free area of human conduct. A right, on the other
hand, may require positive government intervention as well as nonintervention . In a liberal society courts are more comfortable dictating
that the state actors refrain from certain conduct than mandating positive
action on the part of government .
Professor William Lederman describes the traditional distinction between
a freedom and a right in the following passage: 38
The Charter speaks of both rights and freedoms, and there is a jurisprudential
difference between these concepts . Speaking first of the nature of the freedoms
(specified in Charter section 2), one must realize that the total legal system is
quite partial in its direct and specific coverage of all aspects of community life,
individual or collective . There are not laws about everything, and life would be
quite intolerable if there were . . .
Freedom of expression affords a good example. The potential range and depth
of natural and original freedom of expression is as broad and varied as the capacity of the human mind to conceive things to be expressed. The law intervenes only
marginally with a few specific negative limits on what may be expressed. Obscene
words are forbidden, in aid of minimum standards of public decency. Defamatory

Ibid., at pp . 748 (S .C .R .), 604 (D .L .R .) .
W.R . Lederman, Democratic Parliaments, Independent Courts, and the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1985-86), 11 Queen's L.J . 1, at pp . 5-7.
37
3s
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words (libel and slander) are forbidden in order to protect personal reputations
from false and damaging disparagement. Treasonable or seditious words are prohibited because they promote the overthrow of basic institutions of the democratic
state by force, and so on .
In other words, the direct relevance of law to the positive definition of freedom of expression is residual only. What is not forbidden is permitted, and only a
few specific forms of expression are legally prohibited . Moreover, Charter section
1 requires that these few prohibitions must be "reasonable limits prescribed by
law that are demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" . Whether
they have this character can always be reviewed in the courts . . . So, the direct
impact of the Charter guarantee of freedom of expression is, through Charter
section 1, to determine only which legal prohibitions on expression are justifiable
as exceptions to freedom. The same reasoning applies to the other freedoms specified in Charter section 2. . . Generally speaking, if I wish to express political
opinions I can do so, but I must make my own opportunities and take my own
chances on whether an audience can be attracted . No public official or other citizen has any legal duty to see to these things for me . Contrast with this Charter
section 3 which says that every citizen of Canada has the right to vote and hold
elective office . The positive definition of this right in meaningful detail is in the
election laws themselves, which establish voters lists, polling stations and elaborate administrations staffed by public officials with the legal duty to see that eligible citizens wishing to vote have the opportunity to do so . There are sanctions if
the public officials do not do their duty. So, when one speaks of a right under the
Charter, one is usually contemplating a complex of relevant laws that specifically
define, implement and vindicate the right, and without which there would be no
right. The rights of accused persons to a fair trial, or of young people to minority
language education are also of this character, as indeed are many other guarantees
of the Charter

Lederman does recognize that in real fact situations, as opposed to pure
theory, the line between a freedom and a right cannot always be drawn.
Nonetheless, the identification of the unregulated area in which governments cannot act has animated the early jurisprudence on fundamental
freedoms . 39 The Lederman analysis of the distinctions between rights
and freedoms was adopted by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in
Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union v. The Government of
Saskatchewan (the Dairy Worker's case) :"
To understand what one has and what one can do when one has a freedom (as
opposed to a right), one must "delineate the unregulated area"the sphere of
activity within which the freedom reigns . To do that, according to Professor
Lederman, one must "first define the regulated area".

This approach to fundamental freedoms is also consistent with the
pre-Charter approach which is described by Duff C .J.C . in Reference re
Alberta Statutes¢' as "freedom governed by law" . Whether or not such
39
The analysis of Dickson C.J .C . of freedom of religion in both R. v. Big M Drug
Mart, supra, footnote 6, and R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [198612 S.C .R . 713,
(1986), 35 D.L .R . (4th) 1 .
40 (1985), 19 D.L .R . (4th)
.W 97, at p. 108 (Sask.
W
.
609, at p. 618, [1985] 5 .R
C.A .) .
41
Supra, footnote 8, at pp . 133 (S .C .R.), 107 (D .L .R .) .
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an approach is analytically correct, it represents a liberal "laissez-faire"
approach to the activities of government . It fails to take account of some
important realities such as the fact that many people face political and
economic as well as legal barriers to the exercise of their fundamental
freedoms . In doing a purposive analysis of the Charter judges must also
be mindful of the real effects of a particular interpretation . In many
instances positive government action and not merely restraint is required
to make a fundamental freedom meaningful . 42 This is particularly true
for people who fall outside the mainstream of Canadian society and thus
do not fit the liberal image of the autonomous and self-activating individual . Adopting an exclusively liberal approach to fundamental freedoms will produce a status quo interpretation of the Charter. 43
C . Limiting Fundamental Freedoms: Otte Stage or Two?
One of the most important issues to emerge in the early Charter
cases is whether limits can be placed on section 2 in the definition of the
right itself, or only as part of a reasonable limits balance under section 1
of the Charter. Because the burden is on the state actor in section 1 and
because the Supreme Court has taken a restrictive approach to the reasonable limits clause in R. v. Oakes, 44 it is easier to limit fundamental
freedoms by the process of defining the unregulated area under section
2. Perhaps the difficulty in justifying limits under section 1 of the Charter explains the trend towards imposing limits at the first stage of Charter analysis as well as the second . 45 In any event, the two stage limitation is the trend .
Another possible explanation for this more limiting two stage balancing process is the pre-Charter experiences with fundamental free4` In Re Public Service Employee Relations Act, [198711 S.C .R . 313, at pp . 361-362,
Dickson C.J .C . (dissenting) acknowledges that drawing a clear conceptual line between
rights and freedoms can ignore the need for government action to make the latter mean
ingful . He cites as a possible example the regulation of press monopolies to ensure
freedom of the press. Beckton, Freedom of Expression, op . cit., footnote 14, at p. 76,
supports this analysis . Allman v. Comtnissioner of Northwest Territories (1983), 144
D.L .R . (3d) 467 (N .W TC .A .), leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused
May 17, 1984, holds that only rights, not freedoms, justify government intervention .
4; Re Cromer and B.C . Teachers Federation, supra, footnote 7, provides a good
example of this status quo approach .
44
Supra, footnote 19 .
as It is interesting to note that most of the cases adopting two stages of limitation
come after R. v. Oakes, ibid . R . v. Zundel (1987), 35 D.L .R . (4th) 338, 58 O.R . (2d)
129 (Ont . C.A .) is an example.
46 The commercial speech cases, Re Klein and Law Society of Upper Canada (1985),
16 D.L .R . (4th) 489 (Ont . H.C .), and Grier v. Alberta Optometric Association, [19851
5 .R
.W 436 (Alta. Q.B .), are examples of this trend. The latter, Grier v. Alberta
W
.
OptotnetricAssociation, has been reversed (1987), 42 D.L.R . (4th) 327, [198715 WWR .
539 (Alta. C.A .) .

Freedom ofExpression : Is It All Just Talk?

19891

727

doms . Because there was no pre-Charter equivalent of section 1, limits
were imposed on the process of defining the freedom itself . The preCharter free speech case of Fraser v. The Public Service Staff Relations
Board 47 is a case in point:

On the other side, however, it is equally obvious that free speech or expression is not an absolute, unqualified value. Other values must be weighed with it .
Sometimes these other values supplement, and build on, the value of speech . But
in other situations there is a collision . When that happens the value of speech may
be cut back if the competing value is a powerful one. Thus, for example, we have
laws dealing with libel and slander, sedition and blasphemy. We also have laws
imposing restrictions on the press in the interests of, for example, ensuring a fair
trial or protecting the privacy of minors or victims of sexual assaults .

In R . v. Keegstra,48 the Alberta Queen's Bench emphasized that
while the Charter is remedial it is not revolutionary and adopted the
philosophy articulated by E .C . Ewaschuk in the following passage : 49

On balance, the Charter should be viewed as a Canadian product which entrenches
most safeguards already recognized by statute or at common law and which can
work in the context of existing rules and procedures . In that sense, the Charter
affirms the new and re-affirms the old and should be viewed from the perspective
of protecting basic values, and not from the perspective of destroying the old
regime . The Charter can and will work to the mutual benefit of all Canadians if
interpreted from the positive perspective of goodwill and the proper balancing of
the interests of all.

A similar emphasis on historical consistency emerges from the British
Columbia Court of Appeal in Re Cromer and the B .C. Teachers Federations()
A third possible explanation for the two stage limitation is the use
of American cases . The Americans have no express equivalent to section 1 of the Charter, and thus any limitation on the rights or freedoms
must be considered in the context of defining the guarantee. In respect
to the First Amendment to the American Constitution the question is not
about the stage at which limitations may be imposed but rather whether
the right is absolute or subject to limitation . Laurence Tribe summarizes
the situation effectively:"

A recurring debate in modern first amendmentjurisprudence has been whether
fast amendment rights are "absolute" in the sense that government may not "abridge"
them at all, or whether the first amendment requires the "balancing" of compet
ing interests in the sense that free speech values and the government's competing
justifications must be isolated and weighed in each case . The two poles of this
debate are best understood as corresponding to the two approaches, track one and

[198512 S.C .R . 455, at pp . 467-468, (1985), 19 C.C .R . 152, at p . 160 .
(1984), 19 C.C .C . (3d) 254 (Alta. Q.B .) ; rev'd, [1988) 5 W.W.R . 211 (Alta.
C.A .) . This case is now on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada .
49 E .G .
Ewaschuk, The Charter: An Overview and Remedies (1982), 26 C.R. (3d)
54, at pp . 90-91, cited R . v. Keegstra, ibid ., at p. 264 (Alta. Q.B .) .
so Supra, footnote 7.
" Op . cit., footnote 15, pp . 792-793 .
47
4s
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track two, on the first, the absolutists essentially prevail; on the second, the balancers are by and large victorious . While the "absolutes" -"balancing" controversy may have been "unfortunate, misleading and unnecessary", it has generated
several important observations . First, the "balancers" are right in concluding that
it is impossible to escape the task of weighing the competing considerations . Although
only the case-by-case approach of track two takes the form of an explicit evaluation of the importance of the governmental interests said to justify each challenged
regulation, similar judgments underlie the categorical definitions on track one.
Any exclusion of a class of activities from first amendment safeguards represents
an implicit conclusion that the governmental interests in regulating those activities
are such as to justify whatever limitation is thereby placed on the free expression
of ideas. Thus, determinations of the reach of first amendment protections on
either track presuppose some form of "balancing" whether or not they appear to
do so . The question is whether the "balance" should be struck for all cases in the
process of framing particular categorical definitions, or whether the "balance"
should be calibrated anew on a case-by-case basis.

The two tracks alluded to above, refer to track one analysis-concerning
limitations aimed at the content of expression, and track two analysisconcerning restrictions on the flow of information, which is not aimed
directly at the content of the expression . Americans are much more receptive to limitations in the track two situation-time, place and manner
restrictions being classic examples . As Tribe states : sOn track two, when government does not seek to suppress any idea or message as such, there seems little escape from this quagmire of ad hoc judgment,
although a few categorical rules are possible . But on track one, when the govern
ment's concern is with message content, it has proven both possible and necessary
to proceed categorically.

A good illustration of the fusion of section 1 analysis and American
jurisprudence on time place and manner restrictions is Canadian Newspaper Co. Ltd. v. Directeur des Services de la Voie Publique,s3 which
holds that freedom of the press includes freedom from the licensor. While
agreeing that a municipality can place reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on newspaper distribution, the Quebec Superior Court
held that a ban on all vending machine distribution boxes is a Charter
violation . In reaching this conclusion the court appears to mix analogies
to the American situation and a reasonable limits analysis under section
1 of the Charter.
In Canadian Newspaper Co. and Globe and Mail v. City of Victoria, 54
the British Columbia Supreme Court held that the refusal to allow newspaper vending boxes does not constitute a violation of freedom of the
press under section 2(b) of the Charter. Stressing the bona fide intention
of the City Council to preserve the unique aesthetic appearance of the

52

Ibid., p. 584.
ss (1986), 33 M.PL.R . 28 (Que . S.C .) .
54 [198812 WWR. 221, (1987), 20 B .C .L .R . (2d) 217 (B .C .S .C .) .
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city of Victoria and the importance of that appearance to the tourist
industry, the court held:55
In my view these interests are sufficient to justify the prohibition against placing
coin-operated newspaper boxes on the streets . Such a prohibition in my view does
not amount to a prohibition against distribution of newspapers . That would offend
against the Charter. . . No doubt the prohibition affects the pocket book of the
petitioner but that is not the test .

Although Murray J . appeared to be speaking the justification language of section 1 of the Charter, he at no point referred to section l .
Instead he resorted to the American doctrine, of "time, place and man
ner restrictions" not constituting a violation of the right in the first instance .'
He emphasized that other means of distribution were open to the newspaper and that what was really at stake was not freedom of the press but
rather the economic rewards associated with it . The judge had no difficulty in concluding that the Charter was not intended to protect the
economic interests of a large newspaper chain. Whatever the merits of
this conclusion, the mode of analysis adopted is American rather than
Canadian and fails to consider properly section 1 of the Charter. The
result would likely be the same either way but this case is a clear illustration of the confusion that can be engendered by relying too heavily on
American cases.
Because of section 1 of the Canadian Charter judges cannot avoid
some degree of ad hoc or contextualized assessment of when limitations
are appropriate. While this does not produce a clear theoretical frame
work, it does give more scope for doing justice in a particular case. The
early signs are that Canadian judges want to limit fundamental freedoms
at both stages of analysis . Whether this is done in the name of theory or
contextualized conclusions is not clear.
As was noted in the previous section, Dolphin Delivery -57 indicated
a willingness on the part of the Supreme Court of Canada to limit freedom of expression at both the first and second stage of Charter analysis .
Certain kinds of picketing would fall outside the ambit of protected free
speech, making it unnecessary to decide whether such an exclusion from
freedom of expression was a reasonable limitation on the right. But even
though it was unnecessary for him to do so, McIntyre J. indicated how
he would balance the competing interests in a secondary picketing situa55

Ibid ., at pp . 242 (W WR .), 240 (B .C .L .R .) .
In pursuing this analysis Murray J . refers to City of Los Angeles v . Vincent, 466
U.S . 789 (1984), and Info . Retailers Assoc . of Toronto v. Toronto (1985), 22 D .L .R .
(4th) 161, 52 O .R . (2d) 449 (Ont . C .A .) . This latter case concerns the restriction of
adult magazine displays and there is reliance on the idea of time, place and manner
restrictions . However, the Ontario Court of Appeal considers these limitations in the
context of reasonable limits under section 1 of the Charter. Murray J . does not appear to
pick up on this point .
57
Supra, footnote 28 .
5s
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tion . Little evidence was presented in respect to section 1, but the court
felt that certain aspects of the reasonable limits analysis were obvious
and could be discussed even in the absence of evidence . McIntyre J.
concluded that the state could successfully discharge its section 1 burden . The crucial factor was that this was secondary picketing affecting
parties outside the normal collective bargaining relationship . He felt that
the limitation was proportional because the injunction was only temporary. The essence of the reasoning on section 1 is captured in the following quotation:s$
The social cost is great, man-hours and wages are lost, production and services
will be disrupted, and general tensions within the community may be heightened .
Such industrial conflict may be tolerated by society but only as an inevitable
corollary to the collective bargaining process. It is therefore necessary in the general social interest that picketing be regulated and sometimes limited . It is reasonable to restrain picketing so that the conflict will not escalate beyond the actual
parties . While picketing is, no doubt, a legislative weapon to be employed in a
labour dispute by the employees against their employer, it should not be permitted
to harm others .

This case illustrates the wisdom of resolving disputes about the
limits of freedom of expression by openly balancing the competing values. In the context of the Charter this is most effectively done in section
1 . While the Americans must do their balancing in the context of the
definition of the right, Canadians can take advantage of the existence of
section l . A priori exclusions of whole categories of free expression are
not necessary in Canada. Because the burden is on the state rather than
on the applicant under section 1, a decision to balance interests there,
rather than in the right itself, would be one in favour of expanding
freedom of expression . The Supreme Court of Canada, as well as the
lower courts, has kept its options open on this vital question of the judicial approach to fundamental freedoms, but the trend is toward a two
stage limitation .
11 . Who Claims the Benefits of Freedom of Expression?
The limits of time and space allow only a rather cursory review of the
early cases on freedom of expression . Freedom of the press which has
spawned the majority of litigation to date, will be explored in more
detail in the next section of this article . In this section I will identify six
major categories of freedom of expression cases and explore the question of who appear to be the early beneficiaries of the Charter guarantee
of freedom of expression .
A. Political Expression
It could be argued that all expression is political but I am using the
term in its narrower traditional sense. National Citizens Coalition Inc. v.
ss

Ibid ., at

pp . 591 (S .C .R .), 189 (D .L .R .) .
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Attorney General for Canada59 involved a challenge to provisions that
prohibited the printing and distribution of election literature unless it
bore the authorization of a registered political party, and prevented anyone other than authorized parties from incurring election expenses . Arguments that such expenditure restrictions are needed to ensure equality
among all participants did not prevail. The court refused to recognize
the clear advantages that well-funded lobbies such as the National Citizens Coalition have over less financially secure groups . The challenged
restrictions were struck down in the name of freedom of expression . 60
Liberty prevailed over equality as a Charter value .
The Manitoba Court of Appeal took a more progressive approach
to election expenses in MacKay v. (government ofManitoba . 61 This case
involved state reimbursement of some election expenses of a minority
group. Government financial aid to political candidates was - found to be
a legitimate effort to enlarge public discussion and debate rather than an
unconstitutional effort to abridge freedom of expression . Everyone else
is free to assess the views expressed by the subsidized minority group
and free to express his or her views on the same issues .
Access to the relevant information is an important part of freedom
of expression . In International Fund for Animal Welfare Inc. v. The
Queen 61 there was a challenge to regulations which prohibited unlicenced
people from observing or interfering with the seal hunt . The Federal
Court held as follows : 63
An expansive and purposive scrutiny of paragraph 2(b) leads inevitably, in
my judgment, to the conclusion that freedom of expression must include freedom
of access to all information pertinent to the ideas or beliefs sought to be expressed,
subject to such reasonable limitations as are necessary to national security, public
order, public health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others .

Although concluding that section 2(b) was violated, the Federal
Court upheld the regulation on the basis of reasonable limits pursuant to
section 1 of the Charter. It stated that the collective governmental inter
est in protecting the livelihood of the sealers in pursuing their historical
avocation, and in protecting the seals themselves, outweighed the claimed
freedom of expression. Implicit in this holding is the idea that there is a
59

(l984), 11 I7 .L .R . (4th) 418, [198415 WWR. 436 (Alta. Q.B .) .
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S . 1 (1976), charts a similar course in the United States .
[198612 W.W.R . 367, (1985), 39 Man. R . 276 (Man . C.A.). - Cory J., speaking
for the Supreme Court of Canada, dismissed the appeal to that court on the basis that the
appellants had not established an evidentiary base to support the allegation that the
effects of the challenged provisions violated section 2(b) of the Charter. MacKay v.
Manitoba, [19891 S.C .J., No . 88, an unreported decision of September 14, 1989 (S .C .C .) .
62 [19871 1 FC . 244, (1986), 5 F.T.R. 193 (FTD .) ; rev'd [1989) 1 FC . 335,
(1988), 83 N.R . 303 (FC.A .) .
63 Ibid ., at pp . 260
(F.C .), 203 (F.T.R .) .
6'
61
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fundamental right for sealers to earn their living in the historically accepted
way, and that this took precedence over freedom of expression . The
Federal Court of Appeal, however, (in reversing the decision in part)
while agreeing with the "pressing and substantial" purpose characterization of the legislation in protecting the sealers' right to livelihood,
found the restrictions on unlicensed persons' freedom of access both
going beyond the minimal interference necessary and failing the proportionality test under section I . This indicates that access to information as
part of freedom of expression must be weighed carefully against economic or social rights, being commensurate in importance .
Real participation in the political process involves not only money
and access to information, but also access to an appropriate forum to
express opinions . Comité pour la République du Canada v. The Queen 64
raised the question of whether a group can have access to a public airport to propagate its views . At the Federal Court trial level airports were
described as a contemporary extension of the streets and public places of
yesterday in which freedom of expression can be limited but not forbidden. The political group was asked to leave the airport because it was
engaging in political propaganda . At trial this was declared a violation
of the Charter. This is consistent with the court's opinion in International Findfor Animal Welfare v. The Queen that section 2(b) includes
within its guarantees a right of access ."
On appeal in Comité pour la République du Canada v. The Queen,
there were three separate judgments but the majority reversed the finding at trial . One basis for this reversal was the finding that airports are
not public forums . The more alarming approach is that of Pratte J. who
characterizes the issue in terms of property rather than expression . He
holds that since the government owns the airports it can legitimately
restrict their use .66 The early victors in the battle for political free speech
appear to be those with money and a platform to present their views.
Those on the fringes have not fared so well.
There have been also some unusual claims made on the basis of
section 2(b) of the Charter. In R . v. Reid 67 the accused failed to file
income tax returns for the years 1979-1983 on the basis that he did not
have the expertise to fill out the forms and could not afford to hire
someone to perform the task for him . Surprisingly, the argument that
64 [198512 FC . 3, (l986), 25 D.L .R . (4th) 460 (RC .TD.), rev'd, [19871 2 FC .
68, (1987) . 36 D.L .R . (4th) 501 (FC.A .) .
65 Supra, footnote 63 .
66 This same property analysis is used to limit access to public radio frequencies .
Infra, footnote 136. Fortunately, Pratte J .'s view is the dissenting one as the other two
find a violation of freedom of expression .
67 (1988), 57 Alta . L.R . (2d) 1 (Alta. C.A .) .
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requiring a taxpayer to estimate the amount of tax payable was a violation of the section 2(b) guarantee of "freedom of opinion" was accepted
at the Provincial Court level. Both the Alberta Queen's Bench and Court
of Appeal rejected the argument that Mr. Reid's section 2 rights were
violated .
In reaching its conclusion the Alberta Court of Appeal limited the
reach of section 2(b) of the Charter by referring to the purposes and
interests to be protected by that provision of the Charter. 68 In stressing
that some limits must be placed on the scope of the Charter rights themselves, and not all imposed by way of section 1 reasonable limits, Laycraft
C .J .A . stated :69
In their widest sense, the words, "thought, .belief and opinion" would encompass
virtually every mental process . Every human action is preceded by some thought,
however fragmentary, giving rise to some opinion as to the appropriate course to
follow ; to the extent to which that opinion is not susceptible to rigorous proof, it
becomes a belief. Yet the section cannot have been intended to protect, as a "fundamental freedom", the mental aspect of every human activity. The section has
some finite limit.

The above case reinforces the idea of limiting rights at the definitional stage as well as under section 1 of the Charter. Such an approach
is invited when litigants push Charter claims to extreme limits as appears
to be the case in R . v. Reid . Other expansive and novel claims made
under section 2(b) of the Charter have been limited by relying on the
non-application of the Charter under section 32 and the imposition of
reasonable limits under section
o One message is clear. While political expression will be protected, limits will be imposed at various stages
in the Charter analysis .

C

B . Hate Propaganda
Another illustration of the limited uses of freedom of expression for
those on the fringes of the political and moral spectrum is hate propaganda. Two early cases concerning expressions of hatred against the
Jews present conflicting views regarding the limitation of the definition
of protected expression as well as different approaches to the weighing
of section 1 justifications .
68 For purposes
of this analysis it relies on R. Moon, The Scope of Freedom of
Expression (1985), 23 Osgoode Hall L.J . 331 .
6s Supra,
footnote 67, at p . 6.
7° For two more novel, but unsuccessful, attempts to use s. 2(b), see Brisebois v.
Chabot (1988), 50 D.L .R . (4th) 381, 3 .R
.W 669, 66 Sask. R. 126 (Sask. C.A .)
W
.
where a mayor challenged provisions of The Urban Municipality Act which required the
mayor to disclose pecuniary interests in matters before council and precluded him from
taking part in related council debates, and McKinney v. Liberal Party of Canada (1987),
43 D.L .R . (4th) 706, 61 O.R . (2d) 680 (Ont . S .C .), where the plaintiff challenged a
political party's right to exercise party discipline over his Member of Parliament. The
former argument was dismissed under s. 1 ; the latter under s. 32 .
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In R . v. Keegstra 71 an Alberta teacher was charged with promoting
hatred against the Jews by the style and content of his high school history class. James Keegstra was charged under section 281 .2(2) of the
Criminal Code '2 for the wilful promotion of hatred against an identifiable group. As part of his defence he challenged the constitutionality of
the relevant Criminal Code provision as a violation of his rights to freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter. The Alberta Court
of Appeal overturned a Queen's Bench decision which would have placed
hate propaganda outside the ambit of section 2(b) protection. The Court
of Appeal, using the "marketplace of ideas" rationale, held that it is not
just careful and correct speech that is to be protected for the "safe working of a democracy" . This approach ignores "freedom" in the context
of Charter guarantees against discrimination and the promise to promote
multi-culturalism : regarding hate literature as merely imprudent speech
fails to take into account the abridgment of the freedoms of the target
groups . This conclusion did not escape Quigley J . at trial, who concluded that the challenged provision promoted rather than abridged free'
dom of expression :"

In my view, the wilful promotion of hatred under circumstances which fall
within s. 281 .2(2) of the Criminal Code of Canada clearly contradicts the principles which recognize the dignity and worth of the members of identifiable groups,
singly and collectively ; it contradicts the recognition of spiritual and moral values
which impels us to assert and protect the dignity of each member of society; and it
negates or limits the rights and freedoms of such target groups, and in particular
denies them the right to the equal protection and benefit of the law without
discrimination .
Under these circumstances, it is my opinion that s . 281 .2(2) of the Code
cannot rationally be considered to be an infringement which limits "freedom of
expression" . but on the contrary it is a safeguard which promotes it . The protec
tion afforded by the proscription tends to banish the apprehension which might
otherwise inhibit certain segments of our society from freely expressing themselves upon the whole spectrum of topics, whether social, economic, scientific,
political, religious, or spiritual in nature . The unfettered right to express divergent
opinions on these topics is the kind of freedom of expression the Charter protects .
În my opinion, the words "freedom of expression" as used in s. 2(b) of the
Charter do not mean an absolute freedom permitting an unbridged right of speech
or expression . In particular, I hold that s. 281 .2(2) of the Crirniual Code does not
infringe upon the freedom of expression granted by s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal, however, after finding that "imprudent" speech
such as Keegstra's is indeed protected by section 2(b), went on to find
that section 281 .2 of the Criminal Code failed to meet the section 1
proportionality test in that the legislative purpose is to deter serious harm
11 Supra, footnote 48 .
72
71

R.S .C . 1970, c. C-34 .
Supra, footnote 48, at p. 268 (C .C .C .) .
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from hate mongering and the questioned section permits the conviction
of a person who causes "no serious harm or risk of harm" . 74 Kerans
J.A. dismissed the issue of difficulty in immediately proving the success
of hate promotion: "If the accused offers any real threat to the target
group, the Crown should be able to prove it. "75 Kerans J .A . restricted
the range of possible harm from mere annoyance to a sense of alienation
and made a distinction between "isolated abuse" and "crushing systemic discrimination" . '6 The ability to draw a line easily between these
two, especially while failing to consider the impact on the target group's
freedom of expression as "serious harm", is questionable . What Kerans
J.A . calls "psychological pinpricks' 77 may be enough to intimidate minority groups from open expression, particularly those groups without established means of decrying hate propaganda .
In examining the same Criminal Code section, the Ontario Court of
Appeal came to an opposite decision in R. v. Andrews.'$ Freedom of
expression was found not to be absolute, and hate mongering is not
protected in that it is so completely antithetical to the very freedoms of
which its promoters seek to avail themselves . That such speech is not
intended for Charter protection is reinforced by the multicultural considerations in section 27 .
irectly addressing the Keegstra decision, Cory J.A. held that, even
if there were a section 2(b) infringement, section 281 .2 is a reasonable
limit under section 1 : 79
One of the prime reasons put forward in R . v. Keegstra for determining that s. 1
should not be utilized was that s. 281 .2 of the Code does not require proof that the
statements of the accused had actually resulted in acceptance of the hatemonger's
message which would lead to harm or the serious risk of harm to the identifiable
group . . . I cannot accept that as a basis for disregarding s. 1 .
Much of the Criminal Code is aimed at crime where no harm has been
occasioned . . .
The empirical data derived from the history of the Third Reich and the studies
of the Cohen commitee . . . establish not only the risk of harm occasioned to identifiable groups by the promotion of hatred but the actual harm caused . They establish
the need to restrain its promotion and they fully justify the application of s. 1 of the
Charter to its provisions . The impugned section is not simply paternalistic, wellintentioned meddling by Parliament, cutting back on free speech for no real reason .
It is based on the hard, chilling facts of history.

Ibid ., at p. 237 (W W.R .) .
Ibid .
76 Ibid ., at p. 230.
77
Ibid .
7$ (1988), 65 O.R . (2nd) 161 (Ont . C.A .), leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada granted, June 8, 1989 ; 68 O.R . (2d) iii.
79 Ibid
., at pp . 186-187 .
74
75
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A second high profile Ontario hate propaganda case is R. v. Zundel . 8°
Like Keegstra, this case stirred much comment and controversy and
provided Mr. Zundel with a platform to express his views ."' He was
charged under section 177 of the Criminal Code with knowingly publishing false statements likely to injure the public interest . The Ontario
Court of Appeal concluded that Mr. Zundel's exercise of freedom of
expression was outside the protections of section 2(b) . Emphasizing the
distinction between a freedom and a right, the court concluded that section 177 of the Criminal Code is aimed at an area of free expression that
can be legitimately regulated. It was fortified in its view by the similar
conclusion reached in the United States on these kinds of issues ."'- protecting Zundel's expression would advance none of the purposes of freedom of expression .
Hate propaganda has been recognized as a real problem in Canada 81
and the rejection of Charter support for this form of expression is desirable . The cases are a reaffirmation of the value of equality in this area
and the approach followed not only in the Criminal Code but also by
human rights commissions."` What is not so clear is whether Andrews
and Zundel follow the correct path to this conclusion . Since both cases
conclude that the relevant Criminal Code provisions could have been
upheld as a reasonable limit on freedom of expression under section 1 of
,'..-- Charter, this may have been the more appropriate way to balance the
competing interests of liberty and equality. I am not, however, troubled
to live in a country where hate propaganda is outside the realm of protected expression .
C. Public Criticism of the Courts
It is not surprising that Canadian courts have been extensively protected from public criticism . In keeping with British tradition, protections in the form of defamation laws, contempt powers and rules against
scandalizing the courts, have been upheld as necessary to promote the

so Supra, footnote 45 .

$1 H.R .S . Ryan, The Trial of Zundel, Freedom of Expression and Criminal Law
(1987), 44 C.R . (3d) 334 . Interestingly, the re-trial of Mr. Zundel, ordered by the Ontario
Court of Appeal, received very little press or media coverage .
$` Beatrharnais v. People of Illinois, 343 U.S . 250 (1952) .
83
The Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada (1966), chaired then by
Dean Maxwell Cohen, and more recently the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Hate
Propaganda, Working Paper 50 (1986) .
84 The Engineering Students' Society v. Sask. Human Rts. Comm . (1986), 7 C.H .R.R .
D/3443 (Sask . Q.B .), and Canadian Human Rights Commission v. Taylor (1985), 6
C.H .R .R . D/259 5 (FC .TD.) . In the latter case the attempt to avoid contempt by raising
the Charter failed .
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proper administration of justice." In the United States such extensive
protections of the dignity of the judiciary have been rejected as unnecessary,
but, as the following passage from a judgment of the British Columbia
Supreme Court shows," criticism of the judicial system is regarded as a
serious matter in Canada:
No wrong is committed by any one who criticizes the courts or a judge in good
faith, but it is of vital importance to the public that the authority and dignity of the
courts should be maintained and that when 'criticism is offered it should be legitimate . To refer to the jurors in this case as criminals and to describe the judge as
causing exquisite torture is calculated to lower the dignity of the court and to destroy
public confidence in the administration of justice, and a practice of this kind must
be stopped and stopped immediately in the public interest . I find the parties guilty
of contempt and if it were not for the fact that The Vancouver Province possesses a
long and respected background in this community and that an apology, even though
inept, has been made, I would impose severe penalties . . .

Professor Robert Martin argues that Canadian courts have been given
too much protection against public criticism and that the Charter should
be used to reduce the broad powers of contempt . $$ There is no doubt
that such broad powers have a chilling effect on free discussion of the
operation of our courts . There are however reasons why the courts should
have some degree of protection from public criticism.
All society has an important stake in ensuring that the court's reputation for integrity is not tarnished. If courts are viewed as incompetent
to handle disputes or partial, to particular interests, those already enmeshed
in the system will be less likely to accept an unfavourable verdict. If the
parties are not satisfied with the verdict in the sense that they know their
dispute has received a full hearing and that the verdict was rendered
according to accepted principles of law, the court, rather than decreasing
the tension in a dispute, is likely to increase it.
The real question is how much protection judges should be afforded
and how that protection should be balanced against the rights of the
citizen to express freely criticism of the courts . Canadian courts are well

85 Hogg, op . cit ., footnote 33, and Beckton, op . cit ., footnote 14 . Beckton directly
addresses the question of prior restraints on the press in the contexts of defamation and
national security in Freedom of the Press in Canada: Prior Restraints, in Anisman and
Linden, op . cit ., footnote 23, p . 119 .
86
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S . 252, at p . 270 (1941) .
87
R . v. Vancouver Province (1954), 12 .R
.W (N.S .) 349, at p . 358 (B .C .S .C .) .
W
.
A good illustration of the British approach to contempt powers is Sunday Times v. U.K .
(1979), 2 E .H .R .R . 245 (Eur. Ct . of H .R .) .
8$ R . Martin, Contempt of Court : The Effect of the Charter, in Anisman and Linden, op . cit ., footnote 23, p . 207 . Even when judges are acting in a public rather than a
private fashion, the Charter will do little to open the courts to public criticism : British
Columbia Government Employees Union v. Attorney General ofBritish Columbia, [19881
2 S .C .R . 214 .
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protected from adverse comment . Indeed, many would suggest that Canadian judges have more protections from public scrutiny than is desirable
in a free and democratic society." At a time when judges are making
broad political decisions on rights and obligations in Canadian society,
the courts as an institution should be more open to public scrutiny. This
would be a constructive use of section 2(b), but one that is not likely to
come from the very courts which benefit from this shield against criticism .
Common law powers of contempt, as augmented by statutes on
contempt or scandalizing the court, do produce a "chilling effect" in
respect to comments and criticisms about judges . At the Ontario Supreme
court level in R. v. Kopyto, 9° the Canadian Civil Liberties Association in
an effort to intervene in the case made the following declaration by way
of affidavit:

The Association has experienced the chilling effect resulting from the existence of
the common law crime of scandalizing the Court. On many occasions, the Association has been invited by the media to comment on judicial decisions . The Association's awareness of the scandalizing offence has served periodically to inhibit its
ability to make such comments in the most effective manner possible .

The experience of Mr. Kopyto, who was not allowed to practice law
until he apologized to the court, is a vivid illustration of the courts'
power in this area . 9l
The decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal on Mr. Kopyto's appeal 92
does offer some antidote to this rather bleak analysis of the likely use of
section 2(b) in respect to contempt. The court overturned Mr. Kopyto's
conviction on a charge of scandalizing the court. He had called a judge's
ruling "a mockery of justice" . While the court ruled that his comments
were unreasonable and unprofessional, it concluded that to apply a criminal sanction to his conduct would violate his rights to freedom of expression . In so holding the Ontario Court of Appeal emphasized that the
courts were not fragile flowers in need of Criminal Code protection .
This ruling is wide-ranging and thorough, and does suggest that the
Charter will be a useful vehicle for breaking down the immunity from
criticism that the judiciary has traditionally maintained.
D . Free Expression in the Workplace
One of the most important forums for the free expression of ideas
is in the workplace. Picketing is one such form of expression and it is
89

Dolphin Delivery, supra, footnote 28 .
[19871 O.J . No, 117 (Ont . S .C .) .
91
D. Fagan, The Trial of Harry Kopyto : Defence Strategies Draw Fire, The Lawyers Weekly, November 21, 1986, p. 10, and R. Martin, Good Harry or Bad Harry:
which had greater impact?, The Lawyers Weekly, November 28, 1986, p. 8 .
92 R . v. Kopyto (1987), 24 O.A .C . 81 (Ont . C.A .) .
9°
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accorded limited protection in Dolphin Delivery . 93 Even before the Charter the rights of public servants to be politically active was restricted by
the courts . 9' The restrictive provisions on the political activities of civil
servants in Nova Scotia were pared down by the use of section 2 of the
Charter in Re Fraser and Attorney-General of Nova Scotia . 95 While recognizing the value of a civil service that maintains neutrality, (Grant J.
concluded that the scales need to be tipped more towards the free political speech of government employees . Such an interpretation is easily
justified on the political process rationale for freedom of expression .
The degree of restraint that must be exercised depends on the position
and visibility of the particular public servant . 96
In Re Cromer and R.C . Teachers Federation 97 restrictions contained
in a professional Code of Ethics were upheld as not violating a teacher's
freedom of expression. The Code did not prohibit a teacher from criti
cizing a colleague in public, but he or she was only to engage in such
criticism after speaking to the colleague in person . The British Columbia Court of Appeal solved the problem by a balancing of interests and
concluded that Mrs . Cromer's freedom of expression was not violated
on the facts of her case: 98
1 now turn to the balancing of interests involved in determining whether Mrs.
Cromer's freedom of expression, guaranteed by the Charter, overrides the Code of
Ethics which would otherwise apply to her.
The Code of Ethics is designed to avoid disharmony among teaching colleagues, and to promote professional standards, all in the interests of creating an
environment where the children being taught will receive the best educational oppor
tunity possible . As both the trial judge and the judicial committee noted, cl . 5 of
the Code of Ethics does not preclude criticism by one teacher of another ; it sets out
a procedure for making criticism that is intended to increase the beneficial effects
of the criticism and minimize the harmful effects.
On the other side of the balance lies the importance of Mrs. Cromer being able
to speak her mind .

The effect of the levying of compulsory union dues on the individual employee's freedom of expression was explored in Re Lavigne and
Ontario Public Services Employees Union. 99 In rejecting the American
view that a compulsory payment of union dues can be a violation of

93

Supra, footnote 28 .
91 Supra, footnote 47 .
95 (1986), 30 D
.L .R. (4th) 340, 74 N.S .R . (2d) 91 (N.S .TD.) .
96 Osborne v. The Queen, [198613 FC . 206, (1986), 30 D.L .R. (4th) 662 (EC.TD.) .
97 Supra, footnote 7.
99 Ibid., at pp . 660 (D
.L .R.), 290 (C .R.R .) .
99 (1986), 29 D.L .R .
(4th) 321, 55 O.R . (2d) 449 (Ont . H .C .), rev'd (1987), 56
D.L .R . (4th) 474, 67 O.R. (2d) 536 (Ont . C.A .), leave to appeal to the Supreme Court
of Canada granted, June 8, 1989 ; 68 O.R . (2d) iii.
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freedom of expression, '°° the Ontario High Court concluded that the
rather minor depletion of Mr. Lavigne's financial resources was not likely
to hamper seriously his freedom of expression . Nor was the court impressed
by the argument that Mr. Lavigne might become associated with the
political causes supported by his union. While the High Court of Justice
drew a line between union contributions for legitimate collective bargaining purposes and political activity, the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected
this stance,' °' recognizing that judicial values ought not to be imposed
on decisions which are rightly internal to unions, thereby nipping in the
bud a potentially significant limit on freedom of expression for unions .
Existing statutory limitations on unions' freedom of expression have
recently been upheld in Re Ontario Public Service Employees' Union
and Attorney-General of Ontario . 1°` While recognizing that prohibiting
a public service employees' union from making contributions to political
parties was indeed a violation of section 2(b) of the Charter, as were
restrictions on individual employees' abilities to engage in a broad range
of political activities, 103 the acts in question were saved under section 1 .
Eberle J. stressed the important purpose of such legislation:'°'
The involvement of public servants in controversy over current political issues
would, in my view, be a serious breach of that political neutrality and impartiality
which it is so important to maintain . Once that neutrality and impartiality and the
integrity of the public service have been eroded or even if, in the eyes of the
public, those qualities appear to have become eroded, it would surely be a most
difficult, lengthy and perhaps even impossible task to restore them.

While restrictions on certain activities, such as running for office, seem
reasonable, restrictions on such activities as canvassing, for instance, in
actuality do little to maintain neutrality, impartiality or integrity. Further,
Eberle J .'s perception of the public's view of the public service as impartial or neutral belongs to a kinder, gentler era which may never have
existed. Particularly if unions can opt to give money to high profile
political causes vehemently opposed or supported by the existing political parties (as per the Court of Appeal in Re Lavigne), a prohibition
against direct contributions to political parties is a mincing distinction.

E. Commercial Free Speech
The protection of commercial freedom of expression is part of the
larger debate about whether the Charter should extend to the protection
of economic interests. Despite early indications that the courts are reluc" Int'l Assoc . of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S . 740 (1961) .

°~ Supra, footnote 99, at pp . 504 (D .L .R .), 566 (O .R .) (Ont . C.A .) .
(1988), 52 D.L .R . (4th) 701, 65 O.R . (2d) 689 (Ont . H.C .) .
'°s Public Services Act, R.S .O . 1980, c. 418 : Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act, R.S .O . 1980, c. 108 .
104
Supra, footnote 102, at pp . 720 (D .L .R .), 709 (O .R .) .
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tant to extend the Charter to the economic sphere,' °s the Supreme Court
of Canada decisions in Ford v. Quebec (Attorney-General) 106 and Irwin
Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney-General)"' make it clear that commercial
speech is protected under section 2(b) of the Charter. In Ford, a challenge was made to the provisions of Quebec's Bill 101' °8 which required
advertising in French only. The court asked whether there is any reason
the section 2(b) guarantee should not be extended to commercial expression, rather than whether section 2(b) should be construed as extending
to particular categories of expression .'°9 The court pointed to advertising's intrinsic value as expression, the protection such freedom affords
to listeners as well as speakers, and the importance of (supposedly) informed
economic choices to individual fulfilment and autonomy. Accordingly,
no sound basis to exclude commercial speech from the ambit of section
2(b) was found . This reasoning raises questions about the real purposes
of the Charter. It is a classic illustration of the free marketplace of ideas
approach to freedom of expression . An important question is whether
we can really trust companies or the media to fairly inform consumers .
To raise the question is to answer it. In my view the Charter, as a remedial document, should be aimed at protecting those who are not well
served by the political process . Large businesses do not fall into this
category. Promotion of commercial free speech in a media dominated by
business interests is more likely to impair consumer free choice than
promote it.
The decision in Ford set the stage for the Irwin Toy decision, where
issues of economic manipulation were considered and led to an easy
application of section 1 of the Charter to the impugned legislation. Here,
a consumer law prohibiting certain forms of advertising directed at children was saved under section 1, although violating section 2(b) . Emphasizing the lack of any basis for excluding commercial speech from section 2(b) protection, the majority applied a section 1 analysis, first finding
a pressing and substantial need for the legislation and then going on to
discuss proportionality. Here, in addressing "deleterious effects" on advertisers, the majority quite easily held that there was "no prospect""' that
the potential loss of revenues would outweigh the importance of the
purposes of the legislation. The court implied that the Charter's purpose
is not to insure the economic status quo and that restrictions on commercial speech would more easily be saved under section 1 than those on
los Dickson C .J .C .'s comments about the reach of s . 7 in R . v. Edwards Books and
Art Ltd., supra, footnote 39, is one example of this judicial reluctance .
106
Supra, footnote 34 .
107
(1989), 94 N .R . 167 (S .C .C .) .
los Supra, footnote 35 .
109
Supra, footnote 34, at pp . 755-756 (S .C .R .), 610 (D .L .R .) .
110
Supra, footnote 107, at p . 249 .
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political speech, for example . While not eliminating the possibility of
two-stage limitations on fundamental freedoms, the court's choice of
section 1 as the practical means of balancing interests is encouraging .
F Freedom of Expression on the ''Moral Fringes"
Morality is an inherently debatable issue and what practices are
central or on the fringes changes. It could be persuasively argued that
neither prostitution nor pornography are issues of morality-be they at
the centre or on the fringes of our society. What prostitution and pornography have in common is the exploitation of people (predominantly women
and children) for economic gain. So characterized, both prostitution and
pornography raise issues of equality and fundamental justice rather than
expression . Courts have, nonetheless, perpetuated the liberal conception
that regulation of both prostitution and pornography is primarily a limitation upon freedom of expression in section 2(b) of the Charter. This
section provides a classic example of the need for judges to consider
legal perspectives outside the liberal mainstream, such as those of some
feminists. It also emphasizes the importance of interpreting the Charter
in a real-life context.
Limitations on freedom of expression based on liberal concerns about
morality are well established . A flurry of early cases have been precipitated by Canada's tougher new laws on prostitution . In R . v. McLean, I I I
MacKay J. held that freedom of expression does not extend to discussion between a prostitute and his or her customer :
. . . the constitutional values sought to be protected and enhanced by s. 2(b) are
as described by Emerson in his seminal article "Towards A General Theory of the
First Amendment" (1962-63), 72 Yale L.J . 877:
The values sought by society in protecting the right to freedom of expression may be grouped into four broad categories . Maintenance of a system of
free expression is necessary (1) as assuring individual self-fulfillment, (2) as
a means of attaining the truth, (3) as a method of securing participation by
the members of the society in social, including political, decision-making,
and (4) as maintaining the balance between stability and change in the society.
It is those values which, I trust, we have enshrined in our Constitution . It is to
demean the grand concept of freedom of opinion and expression to relate it to the
bargaining between a prostitute and a customer as to what sexual services are
available and at what price.

It is significant to note that the claimed freedom of expression was
excluded from the realm of protected speech and not balanced against
competing values in section l of the Charter. The Alberta Court of Appeal
in R . v. Jahelka` 12 also concluded that communication for the purposes
. . . (1986), 28 C.C .C . (3d) 176, at pp . 183-184. 2 B.C .C .R . (2d) 232, at p . 239

(B .C .S .C .) .
"z (1987), 79 A .R . 44 (Alta. C .A .) . This case has been heard but not decided by
the Supreme Court of Canada.
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of prostitution is not protected expression, but it reached this conclusion
by a balancing of the competing interests in section 1 of the Charter
rather than by a prima facie exclusion from section 2(b) itself . Ontario
courts have gone in every direction on this issue and there is no guidance from that province's court of appeal .
In Nova Scotia, R. v. Skinners t3 took a different approach and protected communication for the purposes of prostitution under the Charter.
More accurately it struck down the offending provisions of the new
prostitution law' 14 on this topic. MacKeigan J .A ., speaking for the majority, expressly rejected the conclusion in R. v. McLean: 115
I respectfully believe this opinion is clearly wrong: freedom is not to be
denied because of the unpopularity of views expounded or the immorality of the
exponent . As Voltaire said, "I do not believe in a word that you say, but I will
defend to the death your right to say it ."

Accepting the political purposes of freedom of expression, the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal also recognized broader purposes-even including commercial activity. Adopting a John Stuart Mill approach to the
topic MacKeigan J .A. stated: 116
No matter how much one disapproves of the prostitute and her customer, the
law must preserve through the Charter their right to live, sexually and otherwise,
without interference by the law where no harm is done to anyone else .

The Manitoba Court of Appeal took quite a different approach to
the question of the Charter and prostitution in Reference re Sections .193
and 195(1)(c) of the Criminal Code . 117 This court went even further than
its Alberta counterpart in concluding that there was no constitutional
protection for carrying on the trade of prostitution in either sections 2(b)
or 7 of the Charter. Characterizing the claim as a strictly economic and
commercial one, the Manitoba Court of Appeal ruled that such claims
are beyond the scope of the Charter. While the judges agreed in the
result they had many different reasons why the challenge should fail .
There was, however, general agreement that to use the Charter to protect
prostitutes would demean the document and that the issue could be resolved
without getting to the balancing of interests under section 1 of the Charter. The Supreme Court of Canada will have to reconcile or reject the
conflicting court of appeal cases when it renders judgment on these cases
in the near future .
113
(1987), 79 N.S .R . (2d) 8 (N.S . App. Div.) . This case has been heard but not
decided by the Supreme Court of Canada .
Criminal Code, supra, footnote 72, s. 195.1 .
R. v. Skinner, supra, footnote 113, at p. 11 .
116
Ibid., at p. 16 . Jones J.A . dissented, concluding that the public exploitation of
women in the streets should not be given constitutional protection .
1 '7 [1987] 6 W.W.R . 289 (Man . C.A .) . Both the Alberta and Nova Scotia cases
were heard in the Supreme Court of Canada during the spring of 1988 . The Manitoba
decision has not been appealed .
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The decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal is illustrative of the
limits that will be placed on the guarantees of the Charter when it comes
to protecting outcasts and people on the fringes of Canadian society. In
the words of Huband J. A. :' 1$

I think that Milton and Mill would have been astounded to hear that their disquisitions were being invoked to protect the business of whores and pimps. I confess
my own astonishment .

I would question whether Milton and Mill would indeed be so astounded.
The statement may say more about the limits of the Manitoba Court of
Appeal's liberalism than those of the originators of liberal theory. Such
statements do reflect the limits of liberal theory in action and throw
doubt on the value of an overarching theory of fundamental freedoms . It
also raises the question of whether other sections of the Charter, such as
sections 7 and 15, might be a more direct way of confronting the thorny
problem of prostitution . I I9
Another age old problem of freedom of expression is what to do
about obscenity. Obscenity offences have been traditionally conceived
as raising freedom of expression concerns, although as indicated earlier
there are other ways of looking at such provisions . As with commercial
speech there is an initial question about whether obscenity should be
excluded from the categories of protected speech, or balanced against
competing claims such as the need to protect children and the rights of
women to equality. R. v. Red Hot Video"' accepted that obscenity is a
form of expression and balanced the competing interests in section 1 of
the Charter. Since this balancing option is not open to the United States,
courts there have tended to exclude obscenity from the First Amendment . Anderson J. in Red Hot Video engaged in an impact assessment
of obscenity on the lives of children and women which has won favour
with some feminists and other commentators . '21 Of course, the section
1 Charter analysis presupposes that obscenity raises freedom of expression issues .
Most of the early Charter cases in this area concern censorship .
The pre-Charter backdrop is Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. MCNei1 122
in which a distribution of powers attack on censorship did not succeed.
In Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society 123 the powers of the
118

Ibid., at p. 295 .

H.W. MacLauchlin, Of Fundamental Justice, Equality and Society's Outcasts
(1986-87), 32 McGill L.J . 231 .
12° (1985),
18 C.C .C . (3d) 1 (B .C .C .A .) . Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada was refused.
121 Such an approach is not as clearly advocated by the Fraser Committee in Report
of the Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution (1985) .
122
[197812 S .C .R . 662, (1978), 84 D.L .R . (3d) 1 .
123
(1984), 5 D.L.R . (4th) 766, 7 C.R.R . 129 (Ont . C.A .) ; leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada granted: 5 D.L .R . (4th) 766.
119
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Ontario Board of Censors was curtailed because the guidelines for censorship were vague and not prescribed by law within the meaning of
section 1 of the Charter. Another challenge came in the customs context
in L,uscher v. Deputy Minister of Revenue. ' e' The Federal Court of Appeal
concluded that the words "immoral" and "indecent" are too broad to
be prescribed by law for the purposes of section 1 . These words were
the key tests for not allowing books to pass through customs . In both the
foregoing Charter cases obscenity, blatantly falling within the Criminal
Code definition, is accepted as a form of protected speech and the issues
are resolved in section 1 of the Charter.
Finally, in Re Information Retailers Assoc. ofMetropolitan Toronto"
the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the freedom to distribute and sell
is as essential to freedom of expression as the freedom to publish. Echo
ing the approach taken by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Skinner v.
The Queen, the Ontario court held that freedom of expression extends
beyond what is pleasing, to expressions that are distateful and morally
offensive . While recognizing the validity of reasonable limits to protect
the sensibilities of children, the net was cast too wide in this case and
the court struck down the relevant by-law.
There is really no pattern to freedom of expression cases at this
point . There are some noteworthy developments, such as the reduction
of the state's powers of censorship, but there are also some questionable
rulings on commercial speech and the denial of political speech to those
who do not have access to the modes of communication. Whether the
courts limit freedom of expression in the definition of the guarantee or
as part of the section 1 analysis varies from one context to another.
While the rationales for the protection of freedom of expression have
been largely liberal in origin they have not been exclusively so . One
pattern is that the people most likely to benefit from freedom of expression are those who can afford to litigate .
G. Application of the Charter to Judges
Since many of the limitations on freedom of expression, freedom
of the press and peaceful assembly operate through the exercise of judicial discretion, the question arises as to whether or not the exercise of
this discretion is governed by sections 2(b) and (c) or any other part of
the Charter. . Contempt of court, rules barring media access to the courts
and injunctions to limit or forbid a parade or demonstration are examples of such judicial actions. The Charter expressly provides for the
application of the Charter to the Parliament and Government of Canada 126
[1985] 1 EC . 85, (1985), 15 C.R .R . 167 (FC .A .) .
(1985), 22 D .L .R . (4th) 161, 52 O.R . (2d) 449 (Ont . C.A .) . This case is on
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
126
Section 32(1)(a) .
124
12s
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and to the legislatures and governments of the provinces . 127 When judges
limit access to the courtroom, issue a contempt citation or enjoin a demonstration, they are usually acting pursuant to some statutory authority
in the broad sense, and, as such, their actions might fall under section
32 of the Charter. The same reasoning can be applied to extend the
Charter to regulatory agencies and administrative tribunals acting under
statutory grants of power. Indeed, the general application of the Charter
to administrative agencies is established in Singh v. Minister of linmigration and Employment . I28
Decisions like Re Southam Inc. and The Queen 129 concerning access
to juvenile trials under the old Juvenile Delinquents Act 130 make it clear
that judges consider themselves bound by the Charter. In R . v. Begley 131
Smith J. flatly rejected the argument that judges enjoyed some special
immunity from scrutiny under the Charter, and the recent New Brunswick case, Charters v. Harper, 132 gives some indication that not only will
judges' action be subject to scrutiny, but they may have lost their common law immunity from personal liability for those actions as well .
Charters did not succeed in his action for damages against the judge on
the basis that the judge was not a state actor, but not on the basis that
judges are above the Constitution . "'
Whether one uses an agency argument or a statutory authority argument, it seems clear that the Charter will apply in many respects to
judicial action . It would be an absurd position if the very agency chosen
to oversee and protect the guaranteed freedoms of our society could
itself be given a free hand to violate these guarantees . The Supreme
Court of Canada decision in Dolphin Delivery 134 does not go that far in
limiting Charter challenges to judicial action . While recognizing that the
Charter could apply to the common law and that the presence of a government actor in otherwise private litigation might change his conclusion, McIntyre J., speaking for the court, concluded that an injunction
against picketing (as between two private parties) was not subject to the
Charter. Dolphin Delivery was a claim for freedom of expression under
Section 32(1)(b) .
[19851 1 S .C .R . 177, (1985), 17 D.L .R . (4th) 422.
129
(1983), 146 D.L .R . (3d) 408, 41 O .R . (2d) 113 (Ont . C.A .) .
13°
R.S .C . 1970, c. J-3. Repealed by S .C . 1980-81-82, c. 110.
131 (1983), 38 O.R . (2d) 59 (Ont . H .C .) .
132
(1986), 74 N.B .R . 264 (N .B .Q .B .) .
133
Charters' application for damages against the judge for breach of his Charter
rights was dismissed because the dispute between him and the judge was regarded as a
private matter rather than one involving state action . Charters v. Harper (1987), 79
N.B .R . 28 (Q .B .) .
134 Supra,
footnote 28 .
127
128
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section 2(b) of the Charter, but the courts were exercising a common
law power rather than a statutory one . If a judge is acting pursuant to
statute that might change the situation, at least in a case where there is a
clear public presence, such as a Crown prosecutor. There is a clear rejection of the broad view that the courts are part of the state machinery and
therefore are subject to the Charter as the other branches of government: 135

It is my view that s. 32 of the Charter specifies the actors to whom the
Charter will apply. They are the legislative, executive and administrative branches
of government . It will apply to those branches of government whether or not their
action is invoked in public or private litigation .

With respect to the courts, McIntyre J. stated : 136

While in political science terms it is probably acceptable to treat the courts as one
of the three fundamental branches of Government, that is, legislative, executive
and judicial, 1 cannot equate for the purpose of Charter application the order of
the court with an element of governmental action .

In the rather unusual case of British Columbia Government Employees Union v. A .G.13 .C. 136a the Supreme Court of Canada applied the

Charter to a judge who issued an injunction against picketing in front of
the courts . Dickson C .J.C., writing for the court, did conclude that the
judicial injunction interfered with the picketers' section 2(b) Charter rights,
but saved the violation as a reasonable limitation under section 1 of the
Charter. Stressing the importance of access to the courts as a vital aspect
of the rule of law, Dickson C.J.C . had little difficulty in concluding that
the section 1 test was met on these facts . McIntyre J. concluded that
resort to section 1 was unnecessary because what was enjoined by the
court order was conduct rather than expression. In Dolphin Delivery
McIntyre J. drew no such distinction betweeen conduct and expression
and it is curious why he felt compelled to raise it here .
®n the question of the application of the Charter to judges Dickson
C.J .C . drew a line between the private and public functions of a judge,
as indicated in the following passage: 136b
As a preliminary matter, one must consider whether the order issued by McEachern
C.J .S .C . is, or is not, subject to Charter scrutiny. RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery
Ltd., [1986] 2 S .C .R . 573, holds that the Charter does apply to the common law,
although not where the common law is invoked with reference to a purely private
dispute. At issue here is the validity of a common law breach of criminal law and
ultimately the authority of the court to punish for breaches of that law. The court is
acting on its own motion and not at the instance of any private party. The motivation for the court's action is entirely "public" in nature, rather than "private".
The criminal law is being applied to vindicate the rule of law and the fundamental

Ibid ., at pp . 598-599 (S .C .R .), 195 (D .L .R .) .
Ibid ., at pp . 600 (S .C .R .), 196 (D .L .R .) . (Emphasis added) . Hogg, op . cit.,
footnote 33, p. 678, espouses the broad view .
136a Supra, footnote 88 .
136b
Ibid ., at pp . 243-244.
135
136
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freedoms protected by the Charter . At the same time, however, this branch of the
criminal law, like any other, must comply with the fundamental standards established by the Charter.

What is not so clear is how far the Supreme Court intends to go in
removing the courts from Charter challenges . If there is a clear public
component to the litigation, or if the judge is exercising a statutory
rather than common law jurisdiction, the court might be more liberal in
applying the Charter to the courts . There appears to be some inconsistency in holding that the Charter applies to the common law but that
judges are not per se state actors . Be that as it may, there will still be
situations where the courts will be considered subject to challenge for
violating fundamental freedoms in section 2 or other Charter rights . It is
safe to say that Dolphin Delivery limits challenges to freedom of expression, the press and assembly in respect to judicial limitations of these
freedoms .
The application of the Charter to judges and other administrative
agencies would have two significant results with respect to the media.
First, judicial decisions would have to be made in such a way as not to
violate freedom of expression, the press and other fundamental freedoms ; secondly, discretionary powers to prohibit access to the courtroom, or otherwise limit fundamental freedoms, could not be exercised
in such a way as to violate these freedoms. Limitations would have to
meet the test enunciated in section 1 of the Charter, unless the courts are
willing to accept limitations as part of the definitions of the freedom
themselves .
111. Expanding Freedom of the Press: What Values Prevail?
A. A Critical Perspective on Freedom of the Press
One of the clearest illustrations of the tacit acceptance of liberal
values in interpreting fundamental freedoms is the approach to freedom
of "the press and other media of communication" . While the latter phase
updates the concept of the press in a technological sense, it has sparked
little in the way of new thinking about the role of the press in Canada's
"free and democratic" society. If anything, the entrenching of freedom
of the press in section 2(b) of the Charter is likely to move Canada
closer to the American idealized version of the vital role of a free press
in a liberal-democratic society.
As Beckton observed, there was little Canadian writing about either
freedom of expression or of the press prior to the Charter; 137 since then
there have been numerous academic articles on the topic-including sev
eral by Beckton herself. A common thread through many of these artiC. Beckton, Freedom of Expression-Access to the Courts (1983), 61 Can. Bar
Rev. 101, at p. 102.
137
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cles is a consideration of American, and to a lesser extent European,
experiences as a guide to Charter interpretations . While Beckton and
other writers are quick to point out that Canadian judges should not
follow automatically American cases, there is little analysis of the philosophical and political differences between Canada and the United States .
More particularly, there is little examination of the different experiences
and roles of the press in the two countries. 138
Advocates of an expansion of freedom of the press speak in glowing terms about the important role played by the press in an open democratic society. By emphasizing the political purposes of freedom of the
press, it can be assumed to have roots in Canada as well as in the United
States . Indeed, its historical and geographical roots appear pervasive
and compelling . Beckton states : 139

Freedom of expression and the press is considered to be the foundation of individual liberty in Western democratic theory. It has been characterized as, " . . . the
matrix, the indispensible condition of nearly every other form of freedom" . Without the freedom to exchange ideas, to seek access to information, and to criticize
the policies of the governing body, an individual is incapable of participating in
the operation of her state, and without individual participation a true democracy
can neither exist nor flourish .

The role of the press in promoting the interests of the citizenry is not
limited to the political realm:"'

Freedom of the press is of vital concern in any democracy. Restraints imposed
on the ability of the press to inform the citizens of a democracy about the activities
of their government, other governments, art, literature and social and political
events generally have to be examined with care .

When links cannot be found between the Canadian and American
position, writers sometimes suggest that the American solution is the
progressive one, and should be adopted in Canada. 141 Traditional British
values such as privacy and the importance of reputation, while acknowledged as important, are subordinated to the vital state interest in fostering a free press. This is the major thrust of the academic writings, but

Glasbeek, in Anisman and Linden, op . cit., footnote 23, p. 100, note 3 in
particular.
139
Beckton, in Can. Instit . For Admin. of Justice, op . cit., footnote 14, p. 149.
McIntvre J. uses words to similar effect in Dolphin Delivery, supra, footnote 25 .
140 Beckton, Freedom
of the Press in Canada : Prior Restraints, in Anisman and
Linden, op . cit., footnote 23, p. 142.
14' D. Henry, Electronic Public Access to Court: A Proposal for Its Implementation
Today, in Anisman and Linden, ibid ., p. 441 . Cameras in the courtrooms is an interesting example of a situation where courts have not been receptive to the American analo
gies, but the Canada Law Reform Commission in Working Paper 56, Public and Media
Access to the Criminal Process, and more recently the Canadian Bar Association have
accepted that Canada should experiment with cameras in the courts . The Special C.B .A .
Committee on Cameras in the Courts drew heavily on the American experience in its
report as a way of reassuring the Bar about the viability of the experiment. Report of the
C.B .A . Special Committee on Cameras in the Courts (August 1957).
138
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judges have been more cautious in embracing American concepts of
freedom of the press. There has been only one Supreme Court of Canada ruling on freedom of the press and little guidance from the lower
courts as to what path Canadian judges will travel .
Professor Harry Glasbeek offers a totally different view of freedom
the
press in Canada-a more sinister view from outside the realm of
of
normal liberal discourse on this topi c . 112 Apart from indicating that
there are important differences between Canada and the United States in
respect to the historical and political roles of the press in the respective
countries, he explodes a central fallacy of the liberal approach to freedom of the press. The press is not neutral . It is closely allied with the
ruling elites of Canada, and because of the high concentration and monopolistic nature of the Canadian media, the general public have little real
access to the press. 143 The Canadian media is largely corporate in nature
and its major revenues come from business advertising . It is little wonder that the views expressed most frequently are those which are sympathetic to business interests . Glasbeek puts it as fo ll ows: 144
Rather than leading to a true diversity of views reflecting idiosyncracies and individualism or creating something like a true marketplace or ideas, establishment
views become, through newspapers, the core views which define the limits of
debate .

On Glasbeek's view, expanding freedom of the press in Canada
would advance none of the claimed purposes of freedom of expression
and the press . The open marketplace of ideas is not really open to expres
sions of serious dissent and the media sets rather than discovers the
agenda . A vivid illustration of the power of the media to limit rather
than expand the range of freedom of expression is the Gay Alliance
Toward Equality v. Vancouver Sun. "5 This case involved the refusal of
the Vancouver Sun to publish advertisements for an avowedly homosexual newspaper. Martland J., speaking for the majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada, upheld the refusal to print the advertisements as a
legitimate exercise of editorial discretion protected by freedom of the
press ."' The rights of mainstream newspapers editors prevailed over the
14- Glasbeek, in Anisman and Linden, op . cit., footnote 23, p. 101 . 1 am indebted
to Professor Glasbeek for his insights on this topic which have sparked a more critical
assessment of the real value of expanding the rights of the press .
14 ; Ibid ., p. 103.
144
Ibid ., p. 107.
145
119791 2 S .C .R . 435, (1979), 97 D.L .R . (3d) 577 .
146 I
n reaching this conclusion Martland J . relied on Miafni Herald Publishing Co .
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S . 241 (1974) . Even in the United States, the courts have limited the
rights of broadcasters to exclude views and upheld a fairness doctrine to allow the airing
of conflicting views: Red Lion Broadcasting Co . v. F.C .C ., 395 U.S . 367 (1969) . Newspaper editors have greater discretion under the umbrella of freedom of the press than
their counterparts in the electronic media.
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rights of the gay minority to have access to the channels of communication . While the Gay Alliance case predates the Charter the conclusion
might well be the same today.

Claims to freedom of the press are made not in the name of the
media per se, but by the media on behalf of the general public . The
early Charter cases have accepted this link between the media and the
general public, in declaring that the rights of the media to freedom of
the press are no greater and no less than those of any other member of
the public ."' This may be false egalitarianism in light of the different
and often conflicting positions of the media and the public . Glasbeek
suggests that the public may be more in need of protection from the
press than from the government . The media may be the enemy and the
government the potential ally : 148
Inasmuch as the media have interests which coincide with those of the ruling
class, they have the potential to become part of the machinery which makes the
state beholden to the ruling class rather than to the general public . Should this be
so, ordinary Canadian citizens ought to have a means to protect themselves from
such influences . The real need may be to protect the state from the press, rather
than the other way around .

One illustration of this reversal of media and government roles appears
in Canadian Newspaper Co . Ltd. v. Attorney-General for Canada . 149
This case concerned a Charter challenge to section 442(3) of the Criminal Code, `0 which prohibits the publication of the name or information
that would disclose the identity of a sexual assault complainant. The
Ontario Court of Appeal held that an automatic ban on release of identifying information was an unwarranted limitation on freedom of the press .
It did leave with the trial judge the discretion to decide whether or not a
ban is needed on the facts of each particular case . In the Supreme Court
of Canada,'"' however, )Lamer J. recognized that a discretionary ban
would discourage rather than encourage complainants to come forward,
since they would be denied certainty. The limits imposed were judged
"minimal" and not disproportional to the legislative aims of eliminating

Moysa v. Labour Relations Board (1986), 28 D .L.R . (4th) 140, 45 Alta. L.R.
(2d) 37 (Alta. Q.B .), app. dismissed (1987), 43 D .L .R . (4th) 159, 52 Alta . L.R . (2d)
193; app. to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed (1989), 60 D.L .R . (4th) 1, (1989]
4W
.W.R . 596 (S .C .C .) ; R. v. G.B ., [1983] 3 .R
.W 141 (Alta. Q.B .) . In R. v. G.B .
W
.
the equating of the rights of the press and the public was justified in the name of Charter
egalitarianism .
'48
Glasbeek, in Anisman and Linden, op . cit., footnote 23, pp . 101-102 .
'49 (1985), 16 D.L .R . (4th) 642, 49 O.R . (2d) 557 (Ont . C.A .) . In the context of a
different section of the Criminal Code (s . 455.3), the court emphasized that openness is
the general rule and the presiding judge must clearly establish the reasons for exclusion
of the public : Canadian Newspaper Co . v. The Queen, unreported decision August 21,
1987 (Ont . S.C .) .
150
Supra, footnote 72 .
151 (198812 S.C .R . 122, (1988), 52 D.L.R . (4th) 690.
'47
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the fears of the complainants in one of the most under-reported of crimes .
Women's groups would certainly see the press as the villain rather than
the hero of this piece . This case also illustrates that freedom of the press
may conflict with other rights-such as the equality rights of women . 152
If one accepts the view that the media is corporate in nature and
allied with the interests of the business elites, an expansion of freedom
of the press offers little hope for individual self-actualization . Because
the media is not really open to views outside the liberal spectrum, it
offers little promise as a real agent of change . By propagating and popularizing the established views, the media can be an impediment to significant change . This situation is reinforced by the decision in New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. Ltd. v. C.R .TC., 153 which held that section 2(b)
of the Charter grants a freedom to express ideas but not to use someone
else's property to do so. There is no right of access to someone else's
land, speech platform, printing press, public building or radio frequencies. Such a judicial approach ensures that those who own the means of
communication will also be able to control the content of the message.
Glasbeek is not even willing to concede that expanding the freedom
of the press would advance an instrumental or political process purpose
for freedom of expression : . ..
Regrettably, progressive people may well be seduced into believing that by making freedom of the press the core of our free speech law (because it offers the
potential to shackle the brooding state), the cause of political freedom will be
advanced . They will be wrong .

Whether advancing freedom of the press performs a useful political
role depends on one's political perspective. Freedom of the press is a
central tenet of the liberal state and the problem is less with the ideal
than with its corruption in practice . The problems of the media as an
agent of change in society has less to do with judicial interpretations
than with the monopolistic and self-interested nature of the Canadian
media itself . Taking account of these realities, the courts may still find
some progressive ways to advance freedom of the press in areas such as
prior restraints on publications, contempt powers and defamation laws .
What judges have done with freedom of the press so far is neither surprising nor alarming . Because most of the freedom of the press claims
have arisen in criminal trials, young offenders proceedings or disciplinary hearings, the early cases concern the interaction of the media and
the courts .
152
Another example of conflicting rights is the interaction of the Charter and defamation . The complex attempts to balance freedom of the press on one side and reputation and privacy rights on the other are explored by Beckton, in Anisman and Linden,
op, cit., footnote 23 .
'53
[198412 F.C . 410, (1984), 13 D.L .R . (4th) 76 (F C .A .) .
154 Glasbeek,
in Anisman and Linden, op . cit., footnote 23, p. 118 .
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. The Courts and the Media: A Case Study in Freedom of the Press

In Canada, the common law rule of the open court is well established . Public access is accepted as a necessary part of our legal system ."'
The rule of access, however, is not absolute. In order to protect other
interests involved in a judicial proceeding, both the common law and
statutes impose numerous limitations on accessibility to the courtroom.
What is required is a balancing of these competing interests .
Federal statutes do not expressly address the electronic media, but
a number of them contain general restrictions with regard to the press.
The Criminal Code, for example, contains various discretionary and man
datory provisions which prohibit the publication of certain items of
evidence,"' names of the accused,"' or victims,"' or banning public
access altogether. 159 The Young Offenders Act 160 also provides prohibitions on access or publication of information relating to juvenile trials .
The provincial jurisdiction relating to the administration of justice
in section 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867, grants the provinces
powers to deal with such matters as camera access to the courtroom.
Despite this apparent authority, Ontario's Judicature Act 161 is the only
provincial statute which prohibits camera access to the courtroom. In all
other provinces, limitations on access are a matter of common law and
judicial practice . This may raise problems of application as previously
discussed.
Although section 92(14) gives the provinces authority to deal with
camera access, pre-Charter case law indicates that this authority is strictly
limited to administrative and procedural matters . The provincial power
ends at the boundary of infringement of individual rights . This is true of
all aspects of the administration of justice but most of the issues have
risen in criminal trials .
1 . Media Access to the Courts
The exact scope of section 2(b) of the Charter is still unclear. One
of the major unresolved issues is whether it grants a right of access to
155
R . v. Southam Inc . No (1) (1983), 146 D .L .R . (3d) 408, at p . 418, 41 O .R.
(2d) 112, at p . 123 (Ont . C .A .), per MacKinnon A .C .J .O . : " . . . such access, having
regard to its historic origin and necessary purpose, already recited at length, is an inte
gral and implicit part of the guarantee given to everyone of freedom of opinion and
expression which, in terms, includes freedom of the press ."
'56
Supra, footnote 72, ss . 470 and s . 76 .1(1) .
157
Ibid., s . 457 .1(1) .
158
Ibid., s . 442(3) .
159
Ibid., ss . 442(l), and during testimony of witnesses, s . 465(1)0) .
160 S
.C . 1980-81-82, c . 110, s . 38(1) .
161 R
.S .O . 1983, c . 223, s . 67 .
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the courtroom. The issue arises because the construction of the section
seems to restrict freedom of the press to a form of expression . This was
addressed in Re Edmonton Journal and Attorney-General for Alberta, 162
where Dea J . distinguished between freedom of the press as a separate
right and freedom of the press as a form of expression :
Freedom of expression is the right to express orally, in writing, or howsoever and
by the media thoughts . beliefs and opinions . . . The freedom which is guaranteed
is the right to express-to speak. to write to communicate . Freedom of the press-on
the other hand-would arguably appear to consist of the right of expression plus
some right to secure the information upon which the expression is based-a right
of access .

Dea J . concluded that on the wording of section 2(b), no right of access
was intended . As such, section 12(1) of the Juvenile Delinquents Act"'
providing "in camera" trials for young offenders did not violate the
Charter. Dea J .'s decision seems to see section 2(b) as merely freezing
the rights of the press at the time of the enactment of the Charter, a view
which cuts deeply into the scope of the Charter's protection and violates
the "living tree" doctrine of Estey J . in Skapinker v. Law Society of
Upper Canada. 164
R . v. Banville 165 also adopts a narrow view of section 2(b) in holding that publication bans in the criminal justice system do not interfere
with freedom of expression and the press . The case was, however, decided
on the basis of non-retroactivity of the Charter so the findings with
regard to section 2(b) are obiter.
A different approach was taken in Reference re Constitutional Validity of Section 12 of the Juvenile Delinquents Act. 166 Rather than follow
the path set out by Dea J . in Edmonton Journal, the Ontario High Court
read section 2(b) as including a right of access and held invalid all
mandatory provisions requiring juvenile trials to be held "in camera" .
This view was supported in R. v. Southam Inc., 167 where the Ontario
Court of Appeal held that access to the courts is an integral part of
freedom of the press. MacKinnon A.C .J .O ., in a purposive approach to
section 2(b), concluded that the objects of a free press-maintenance of
democracy, achievement of justice and the old principle that justice be
seen to be done-cannot be fostered by an absolute publication ban on
criminal proceedings .

162
163
164
165
166
167

(1983), 42 A.R . 383, at p. 387 (Alta. Q.B .) .
R.S .C . 1970 . c . J-3 .
Supra, footnote 4 .
(1983), 145 D.L .R . (3d) 595. 34 C.R . (2d) 20 (N .B .Q .B .) .
(1982), 2 C.R .R . 84 (Ont . H.C .) .
Supra, footnote 155.
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This does not mean that there can be no ban of access to the courts .
In Re ,Southam Inc. and The Queen 168 sections 38 and 39 of the Young
Offenders Act"' were upheld as reasonable limitations on the principle
of a free press. The sections forbid the publication of the names or
identifying information about young offenders and give judges the discretion to exclude the public from trials in accordance with certain statutory guidelines . Central to the court's conclusion was the fact that the
protection and rehabilitation of young people is a value of such superordinate importance that it justifies placing reasonable limits on the freedom of the press.
While courts are reluctant to exclude the press from criminal or
juvenile trials, they are less reticent in civil proceedings. In Edmonton
Journal v. Attorney-General for Alberta 170 the Charter challenge was to
section 30 of the Judicature Act' 71 which severely limited what could be
published about matrimonial causes and pre-trial civil proceedings . Accepting that there was a violation of section 2(b) of the Charter, the court
engaged in an extensive section 1 analysis and upheld the challenged
provisions. Concerns about damage to children, the privacy of non-parties,
and encouragement to use the courts outweighed the public interest in
access to this kind of information. Kerans J .A . accepted that the challenged provisions may be overly broad but rather than strike them down,
he reserved the right to make a constitutional exception to the statute in
a case where the administration of justice would demand the publication
of the information in issue.
Similarly in Re Ilirt and The College of Physicians and Surgeons
of British Columbia, 172 where the issue was disciplinary action against a
doctor, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the names and
identities of complainants before the discipline board should be kept
secret . The limitation was accepted as reasonable because there was
only a partial ban on publication and the value of having complainants
come forward is great. There are also occasions where it is appropriate
to conduct administrative proceedings in camera."' Even where the rule
168
(1984), 14 D .L .R . (4th) 683, 12 C .R .R. 212 (Ont . H .C .) ; aff'd, Re Southam
and The Queen (1986), 26 D .L .R . (4th) 479, 20 C .R .R . 7 (Ont. C .A.) .
169 Supra, footnote 160 .
170 (1987), 41 D .L .R . (4th) 502, [1987] 5
W.W.R . 385 (Alta . C .A .) . On appeal to
the Supreme Court of Canada .
171 R .S .A . 1980, c . J-1 .
172 (1985), 17 D .L .R . (4th) 472, [198513 W.R .R . 350 (B .C .C.A .) .
173
McKenzie v. Canadian Human Rights Commission (1985), 6 C .H .R .R . D/2929
(RC .TD .) . However, media access is now granted to proceedings which have been
traditionally held in camera, such as immigration detention review hearings ; Southam
Inc. v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1987] 3 EC . 329 (FC .TD .) . See, as
well, Ottawa Police Force v. Lalonde (1986), 24 Admin . L .R . 145 (Ont . Dist . Ct .) .
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is openness, the courts have upheld broadly worded exceptions, holding
that they did not swallow up the rule so as to violate section 2(b) of the
Charter.' 7`'
Courts have been less generous in protecting the privacy of the
subject of a complaint before a lawyer's disciplinary board . In Canadian
Newspaper Ltd . v. Law Society of Upper Canada 175 the Ontario Divi
sional Court held that the Law Society had no authority to issue a ban
on the publication of disciplinary proceedings. The potential damage to
the reputation of innocent lawyers did not outweigh the values of freedom of the press in this context. However, the court also held that there
was no obligation on the Law Society to supply the media with information or even notice of the disciplinary hearings . Thus when access is
granted it is not always meaningful in media terms . Many disciplinary
hearings will take place without the press because their existence is unknown.
The degree of access may also be limited .
In Toronto Sun v. Attorney-General for Alberta 176 the court indicated a strong inclination to protect the identities of the complainant in a
sexual assault case, or any other innocent parties . This case involved a
voire dire about the sexual relations between the accused and the complainant as well as others . In order to protect the identity of innocent
parties the Alberta Court of Appeal was willing to extend its normal
Criminal Code powers . While the privacy of the accused is not a major
consideration, the privacy rights of other parties often prevail over full
press access .
While meaningful media coverage requires access to information,
as well as to the proceedings, courts have not extended freedom of the
press that far. The Queen v. Thompson Newspapers Ltd. I" held that
freedom of the press is essentially freedom from censorship . It is freedom in the classic liberal sense of restraining government action but not
requiring the agents of the state to make access meaningful by allowing
the media to examine physical evidence or documents before the court
or make photocopies of such evidence .
Accepting that section 2(b) includes a right of access to judicial
proceedings, is this broad enough to cover the electronic media? Although
earlier cases do not address the electronic media, the Ontario case of R .
v. Squires 178 indicates the importance that this issue will have in the
future . The significance of the cameras in the courtrooms issue is also
174
Q.B .) .
175
176
177
178

The Edmonton Journal v. City of Edmonton (1987), 24 Admin. L.R . 205 (Alta.
November 27 . 1986 (Ont . Div. Ct .) .
t1985] 6 W W R. 36 (Alta. C.A . ).
December 8, 1983 (Ont . H.C .) .
(1986) . 23 C .R .R . 31 (Ont . Prov. Ct .) .
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underscored by the studies of the Law Reform Commission of Canada
and a special Canadian Bar Association report on the topic . "9
As noted by Clare Beckton and Wayne MacKay,' $° while it was
open to the American courts to use limitations implicit in the term "press"
and to distinguish between conventional and other forms of the media,
section 2(b) will not support such a distinction, because it guarantees the
right to a free press and other media of communication. This wording
indicates an intention not to limit the press to its traditional print form.
In a society where so much emphasis is placed on television as the
major source of information, to exclude the electronic media from section 2(b) would leave unprotected a major segment of today's press .
This argument was met head on and dismissed by Provincial Court Judge
Vanek in R. v. Squires.
The Squires case concerned a challenge to section 67(4) of the
Ontario Judicature Act . '$' The accused, a journalist, was charged with
directing the filming of a person emerging from a trial. In an application
to quash the charge on the basis that section 67 was inconsistent with
section 2(b) of the Charter, Judge Vanek held that there was no infringement of freedom of the press . Since this ruling the journalist has been
convicted for breach of the Judicature Act and fined $500.00. This clears
the way for an appeal to the Charter issue, which has been launched .
Squires is the test case on the rights of the electronic media.
Judge Vanek in Squires adopted the narrow approach seen in Edmonton Journal 18' and Eanville, 183 accepting section 2(b) as an entrenchment
of the common law rights relating to the press. He viewed the freedom
of the press as a right to disseminate information obtained, without a
right to news gathering itself . It definitely is not to include a right to
bring photographic or broadcast equipment into the courtroom: '$4
Moreover, it [the right of access] is a right of members of the general public ;
representatives of the press and other media of communication possess the same
right of access but merely in their capacity as members of the general public .

Two things in Judge Vanek's judgment are encouraging to an expansion of free press values . He recognized that "other media of communication" was meant to include the electronic media, and more important,
that the press and the electronic media have equal rights of access . It is

Supra, footnote 141 .
180 Beckton, loc. cit., footnote 137; W. MacKay, Courts, Cameras and Fair Trials :
Confrontation or Collaboration? (1985), 8 Prov. Judges J. 7. Section 15 of the Charter
could also be sued to challenge the unequal treatment of the print and electronic media.
181
R.S .O . 1980, c . 223 .
182
Supra, footnote 162.
183
Supra, footnote 165.
184
Supra, footnote 178, at p. 52.
179
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on the question of the extent of this access that Judge Vanek took a
narrow view. If his recognition of the equal rights between the print and
electronic media are combined with the wider definition of access seen
in Southain 185 the right to televise judicial proceedings would easily fall
under freedom of the press and other media of communication.
Judge Vanek placed considerable weight on the conclusion that the
effect of televised news coverage was qualitatively different from the
effects of the conventional media. He felt a disproportionately greater
effect resulted because of the ability of the electronic media to project
the image of the participants in the proceedings . The weakness of this
argument is the fact that newspaper coverage often includes sketches or
photographs of the participants which makes their identification almost
as likely. That the televised proceeding reaches a greater number of
people should not result in the automatic conclusion of negative impact .
The majority of people who get their information from the electronic
media have as much right to know what happens in courts as the smaller
group who read newspapers . That the reality will be distorted is no more
justification for excluding the electronic media than the press .
Allowing television reporters to attend and report only in the same
manner as conventional media (by sitting in a courtroom and taking
notes), fails to consider several essential elements . First, televised report
ing relies almost exclusively upon video presentations. The ability to
film and report on events using film is an essential feature of television
journalism . Second, the decision in Squires does not put the electronic
media on an equal footing with the print media; it makes them the equivalent of the print media. Equality should not mean that the electronic
media must perform their functions in the same manner as the print
media . If the right under section 2(b) includes access to the courtroom,
then both the print and electronic media should have an "equal benefit"
of this access . Failure to accommodate the unique characteristics and
tools of the trade of the various forms of the electronic media is a potential denial of the equality guaranteed by section 15 of the Charter.
2 . Freedom of the Press v. Other Legal Rights
Despite the recognition of the common law concept of the open
court, it is clear in all the judgments to date that this is a concept which
yields readily to other legal interests. Concern for the protection of witnesses,
jurors, victims and the accused, the integrity of the judicial system, and,
most often, the emphasis on the accused's right to a fair trial, have all
been used to validate limitations on media access to the courtroom. These
concerns have been emphasized in the past and in some early cases
iss Supra, footnote
155.
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under the Charter. 196 The past practice has failed to balance competing
legal interests, but relied instead on the subordination of one right to
another. This position must be re-evaluated if any meaning is to be given
to the constitutional guarantees of: freedom of expression and the press;
the right to a fair and public trial before an impartial tribunal ; and, the
right to life, liberty and security of the person . 187
(a) A Fair and Public Hearing

The concept of an accused's right to a fair trial has been the most
consistent justification for limitations on access to the courtroom. The
traditional position is that the clash of the fair trial and freedom of the
press must always result in the subordination of the press to the trial . 188
An interesting contrast is the American view, where the mere claim of
danger to the fair trial is not sufficient to warrant an exclusion of the
press, unless there is no reasonable alternative for preserving the accused's
right to a fair trial. 189 Although there is some support for this position in
Canada, the weight of authority leans heavily towards the fair trial.
The publicity that arises out of judicial proceeding admittedly can
have negative effects . There is the possibility that pre-trial publicity could
prejudice unfavourably potential jurors against the accused. Media cov
erage could stigmatize the accused as guilty even before he or she is
convicted, a result that destroys the presumption of innocence . Witnesses
may be less likely to step forward or to tell the truth if they fear identification, embarrassment or injury . Certain complainants may refuse to
cooperate if they cannot be guaranteed privacy, and there is the threat
that publication of information of pre-trial proceedings, which may not
be admissible evidence at trial, could affect the jury prejudicially.
n the other hand, openness and publicity also serve a vital role for
the accused. It places judges, counsel, witnesses and the jury under
public scrutiny so their fairness, competence and honesty can be judged .
In these respects, both the public and the accused have a mutual interest
in the fairness of a trial."' But there is more at stake in the issue of
openness than the fairness of the trial. Openness serves a number of
186

See, for example, Re Global Communications Ltd . and Attorney-General of
Canada (1983), 148 D .L .R . (3d) 331, 42 O .R . (2d) 13 (Ont . H .C .), aff'd (1984), 5
D .L.R . (4th) 634, 44 O .R . (2d) 609 (Ont . C .A .) ; R . v. Begley, supra, footnote 131 ; R .
v. Banville, supra, footnote 165 . While publication bans are accepted as sometimes
necessary to ensure a fair trial, such a ban would be temporary and imposed in the least
restrictive manner. R . v. Sophonow (No . 2) (1983), 150 D .L .R . (3d) 590 (Man . C .A.) .
187 The potential conflicts between s . 2(b) of the Charter and legal rights, such as
ss . 7 and 11(d), have been important in determining the scope of freedom of the press .
188
Supra, footnote 186 .
189 Richmond
Newspapers Inc . v. Virginia, 100 S . Ct . 2814 (1980) .
190 R . v. Robinson (1983),
34 C .R . (3d) 92 (Ont . H .C .) .
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social values that may conflict with the accused's right to a fair trial, but
are nonetheless of sufficient importance to justify serious consideration.
Secrecy has always been the foundation of suspicion. Openness removes
this suspicion and places the proceeding in the public eye. The ability to
attend and observe a judicial proceeding may enhance confidence in our
legal system and the administration of justice. Procedures that the public
perceive as fair will be more readily accepted than those done behind
closed doors . There is an important interest in regulating the conduct of
the courts to ensure that they are performing their function properly.
These public concerns must be given strong consideration in deciding upon the reasonable limitations on media access . A suspected threat
to a fair trial should not be enough to justify exclusion. Section 11 (d) of
the Charter guarantees not only a fair trial but also a public trial . This
dual guarantee may not always operate in favour of the accused . While
an accused may rely upon the guarantee of a fair trial to limit possible
prejudicial conduct, the media is equally able to argue that limitations
on access would infringe the right to a public trial . Media reliance on
section 11 (d) has been very limited to date, and most cases have been
based on section 2(b) directly.
(b)

Security of the Person

There also exists a number of interests not directly involved with
the accused's guaranteed fair trial that may conflict with the rule of the
open court . At common law, it is recognized that the court has an inher
ent power to protect witnesses, victims and the accused from the injurious effects of publicity in certain circumstances. As stated by Viscount
Haldane: 1 91
As the paramount object must always be to do justice, the general rule as to
publicity, after all only a means to an end, must accordingly yield.

The Criminal Code expressly recognizes the rule of the open court,
but also lists three general exceptions to this rule: the interest of public
morals ; the maintenance of order; or the proper administration of justice. 192
There also exist various powers such as the discretion to ban publication
of the names of victims of sexual assault"' and the powers to exclude
any or all members of the public during testimony of witnesses . 194 In
addition, the Young Offenders Act 195 permits the judge to restrict access
to the court if there would be a threat of serious injury or prejudice to a
19, Scott v. Scott, [1913] A.C . 417, at pp . 437-438, [1911-13] All E.R . 1, at p. 9
(H .L .) .
192
S. 442(1) of the Criminal Code, supra, footnote 72 .
193 Ibid., s. 442(3) .
194
Ibid., s. 465(1)(j).
19s
Supra, footnote, s . 39 .
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young accused, witness or victim . All these provisions and exceptions
indicate a recognition of various private interests involved in a trial that
must be balanced against the rights of media access to the courtroom.
Although there appears to be a reluctance to apply widely these
protections, 196 the Supreme Court of Canada in Attorney-General of Nova
Scotia v. MacIntyre' 97 emphasized the superordinate importance of the
protection of the innocent . This is a protection that could seem to extend
to witnesses and victims-presumably innocent participants in the trialand to the accused who is guaranteed the right to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty. Nonetheless, MacIntyre concludes that the general
rule is openness .
There are several arguments which favour the protection of witnesses
in a judicial proceeding . Fear of public identification, whether for reasons of embarrassment, or danger, may prevent prospective witnesses
from coming forth or from cooperating to their full ability. Generally
speaking, courts are reluctant to restrict publicity merely to avoid embarrassment or to protect the sensitivities of the witness . As Huband J .A.
stated in Re FP Publications and The Queen:'98

There are enormous numbers of witnesses in both civil and criminal trials who
find it embarrassing, inconvenient, damaging or even dangerous to testify. Yet
there are few known cases where the Court has protected a witness from such
hazards by clothing the witness with the anonymity of the closed courtroom. . . 1
have difficulty in understanding why the time-honoured concept of an open trial
should come crashing down to the ground to convenience such witnesses . . .

Bans on publicity have been used to encourage a witness to testify' 99
and most often to protect witnesses from potential physical danger. 200
The accused is generally denied protection from publicity even when
identification could lead to substantial harm . In R . v. Several Unnamed
Persons2°' the court refused to prohibit the publication of the names of
several men charged with acts of gross indecency. One area where protection has been guaranteed to the accused stems from Dickson J .'s decision in Attorney-General for Nova Scotia v. 1VIacIntyre. 2°2 The value of
protecting an accused, whose house was searched under a warrant but
196 Re ER Publications and The Queen (1979), 108 D .L .R . (3d) 153, [1980] 1
.R
.
W
.504
W
(Man . C .A .) ; R. v. Quesnel and Quesnel (1979), 51 C.C .C . (2d) 270 (Ont .
C.A.) .
197 [1982] 1 S.C .R . 175, (1982), 132 D.L .R . (3d) 385, 65 C.C .C . (2d) 129.
198
Supra, footnote 196, at pp . 168 (D .L .R .), 514 (W.W.R .) .
199 R
e Cullen and The Queen (1981), 62 C.C .C . (2d) 523 (Alta. Q.B .) .
200 R.
v. McArthur (1984), 13 C.C .C . (3d) 152 (Ont . 11 .C .) . This case involves the
testimony of inmates in a prison where revealing the identity of informants could result
in death.
201 (1983), 44 O.R . (2d) 81 (Ont . 1i .C .) .
202
Supra, footnote 197 .
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nothing found, was held to justify curtailment of public access . In Canadian Newspaper Co. v. Attorney-General of Canada 2" a freedom of the
press challenge was raised to section 443.2(1) of the Criminal Code 204
prohibiting the publication of certain information in search warrants .
While accepting that privacy is an important value, the Ontario court
concluded that the means adopted to protect this value are too intrusive
of freedom of the press and thus do not meet the section 1 test of the
Charter. The Charter may be changing this area of the law.
Section 7 may offer protections to individuals because of the guarantee of "security of the person" which can be read broadly. Security of
the person can be argued to provide the right to be protected from injury
or harm caused by publicity. The Ontario High Court, however, in R . v.
Several Unnamed Persons, 2°s refused to apply security of the person to
shield the identity of the accused . There is also the possibility that section 7 could be read as including a right of privacy that could protect
individuals in a trial. R . v. Several Unnamed Persons may indicate that
privacy will not be read into section 7, but, in light of the Supreme
Court of Canada decision in Hunter v. Southam Inc."' holding that the
section 8 right to be secure against unreasonable searches encompasses a
reasonable expectation of privacy, could indicate a willingness to read
an overall right of privacy into the Charter. This remains to be seen.
Press gag orders to protect the identity of the complainant in a
sexual assault case have been routinely upheld . That is the direction of
section 442(3) of the Criminal Code, 207 and courts have not accepted
Charter challenges to this provision . The more difficult problem is determining when a judge should issue a gag order to protect the identity of
the accused in sexual assault cases. Two recent Ontario Supreme Court
rulings emphasized the importance of open trials and held that there
should only be a publication ban if publicizing the accused's name might
reveal the identity of the victim . 2°s These cases stress the need for the
judge to hear evidence on the issue prior to imposing a ban . In Smith v.
Crampton,' which involved charges of gross indecency against an Ottawa
school teacher, a gag order was imposed without hearing evidence . Dis-

203
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agreeing with the earlier ruling, Smith J . imposed a ban because he was
concerned about revealing the identity of the fifteen year old male victim .
There have been many cases dealing with the access of the media
to the courts . The number of cases is explained, in part, by the ability of
the media to fund such litigation . This in itself is a reminder that the
media is not in the same position as a private citizen."' To date Canadian courts have not accepted an extravagant version of freedom of the
press, but have pursued a cautious path of balancing the competing interests against freedom of expression . Even though this balancing has been
done as an evaluation of reasonable limits in section 1 of the Charter,
many limits have been accepted . There has been little real consideration
of the nature and role of the media in Canadian society. Instead the
Charter guarantee of freedom of expression allows judges to give constitutional status to the common law principle of open adjudication .
Conclusion
In any democratic society freedom of expression and freedom of the
press are important ideals . The difficult task facing the courts is giving
these ideals some concrete form in the practical world. One of the frequently raised criticisms of the judicial approach to the task of interpretation is that it is unduly cluttered with liberal theories and middle class
values . Freedom of expression may be an important liberal value but it
does not put food on the table or compensate for the hardships of poverty. Poor people often cannot afford freedom of expression in either the
political or economic sense. Litigation costs money and if you are on
welfare or a marginal worker the political price of speaking out may be
the loss of your livelihood .
In a critical analysis of freedom of speech in the United States,
Adeno Addis and David Fraser describe the limits of the American liberal approach to freedom: 211

In modern capitalist societies freedom of the press and the right to free speech
offer those of us who strive for qualitative change little solace . The freedom of the
press is the freedom of property. The right to free speech is the "right" to an
ideology of domination through generalization to the ever tightening circle of onedimensional thought.

Addis and Fraser reserve their most biting attacks for the press
which, like CSlasbeek, 212 they regard as the enemy, not the ally of freedom of expression : 213
21o
An important question is whether the media's desire for access to the courts is
only a desire to enhance profits or also a genuine desire to perform an important civil
duty .
211 A.
Addis and D. Fraser, Chant Down Babylon: Libertarian Socialism and Free
Speech, an unpublished paper, at p. 34 .
212
Glasbeek, in Anisman and Linden, op . cit., footnote 23 .
213
Loc. cit., footnote 211, at pp . 28, 32 .
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Notions of freedom of the press in the United States have always involved disputes between elites . The "public's right to know" is often invoked when pressing
claims for media freedom but the public's right to know is limited by the boundaries of capitalist ownership of the means of production and communication. Freedom of the press has had, and under capitalism still informed by a liberal mythology, will continue to have, a purely negative character, the right to be free from
state intervention .
Nuclear weapons and Miss America deserve and get the same treatment on the
Evening News . The distinction between quantity and quality becomes imperceptible. Like the Martin Sheen character in Apocalhpse Now, we sit in a stinking hotel
room while the enemy is out there, getting stronger every day. As each moment
passes, the utopian kernel, the potential for radical disruption in communicative
action seems to slip further from our grasp.

The authors do not give up in despair but call for a democratization
of the media and the practice of freedom of expression as a self-actualizing
and liberating experience . Communication is a powerful tool in chang
ing society-a fact recognized by liberals as well as those on the left of
the political spectrum . Thomas Emerson sets out the following basic
purposes of freedom of expression :'214
(1) assuring individual self-fulfillment ;
(2) advancing knowledge and discovering truth;
(3) providing for participation in decision-making by all members
of society ; and
(4) achieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable community . . . maintaining the precarious balance between healthy
cleavage and necessary consensus .
The emphasis has been on the elements of consensus rather than
cleavage, but freedom of expression can sow the seeds needed to transform society, as well as consolidate the status quo. There needs to be a
shift away from an instrumental role for freedom of expression to a role
designed to promote self-actualization, not just for individuals but also
for communities of people . In this latter role, freedom of expression and
its -elated freedoms can be agents of change . For this to happen judges
will need to consider alternative perspectives on freedom of expression,
such as those expounded by Critical Legal Scholars and Feminists . More
importantly, judges need to escape the American straight jacket of liberal theory and concentrate on the real impact of judicial interpretations
on the lives of those who live on the margins of society, as well as those
who dwell in the centre . If this were to happen, the freedom in section 2
of the Charter would become truly fundamental .

214
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